


Marin Election Integrity Committee

Fair Political Practices Committee ID #1456997



November 2022 General Election Final Report

April 2023

Authors

The authors of this report consists of a group of individuals associated with the Marin Election Integrity Committee..

Contributors

The contributors to this report are many. The report was compiled from observations by 23 election observers..

FPPC Recipient Committee

The Marin Election Integrity Committee is a recipient committee of the FPPC ID#1456997.

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Abbreviations

Common abbreviations used in this report.

API	Application Programing Interface
BMD	Ballot Marking Device (at Vote Centers)
CA	State of California
CA GOP	California Republican Party
CVR ballot	Conditional Voter Registration ballot (not folded)
DEM	Democratic Party
DFM	DFM Associates voter roll software
E&I	Extraction and Inspection (of ballots)
EC	Elections Code
FEC	Federal Election Commission
FPPC	Fair Political Practices Commission
Live ballots	Ballots voted in-person at Vote center (not folded)
MCRCC	Marin County Republican Central Committee
MEIC	Marin Election Integrity Committee
REP	Republican Party
RNC	Republican National Committee
ROV	Registrar of Voters
SoS	Secretary of State
USPS	United States Postal Service
VBM ballots	Vote-By-Mail ballots (folded)
VC	Vote Center
VCA	Voter's Choice Act

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Executive Summary

Marin County California has fully moved to the Voter's Choice Act (VCA) election system that implements mass Vote-By-Mail (VBM) ballots with an electronic system. The county is perfect for observing this new election process because it is relatively small compared to other Bay Area counties and one can readily comprehend how ballots are collected and processed. The VCA eliminated checks against voter fraud inherent in conducting elections at the local level by centralizing and concentrating control at the Marin County Civic Center.

The Marin Election Integrity Committee (MEIC) was formed in December 2022. It is not associated with or supported by the Republican Party. Active committee members comprise a diverse skillset of recruiters, organizers, researchers, and analysts. These volunteers quickly created an election integrity program that enabled them to recruit volunteers, create training materials, develop a team of knowledgeable election observers, and produce this report.

The MEIC acquired official data and performed extensive research and analysis on California and Marin County election results and voter rolls. It developed a website to recruit, train and schedule observers. Committee members developed extensive observer training materials and developed three observer training courses. Four live online training classes were offered for each course via Zoom; six in September 2022 followed by another six in October of 2022.

This report presents a summary of committee member observations, key findings, conclusions, and recommendations. *The most alarming finding comes from a discovery that is not adequately explained that Marin County Voters may have had excluded 7,947 ballots from the County's certified election results for the November 2022 election.* The question was made to the Marin ROV and the answer is included with this report.

It is now clear that the VCA encourages vulnerabilities that threaten fair and legitimate elections in Marin County, thereby reducing voter confidence in the results. Fundamental changes in our election system are desperately needed to restore voter confidence in Marin County.

Voter's Choice Act

Governor Jerry Brown signed Senate Bill 450 into law in 2012, which allowed all counties to replace polling places with vote centers and to send vote-by-mail ballots to each registered voter. On May 25, 2021, the Marin County Board of Supervisors approved resolution 2021-33 confirming implementation of the California Voter's Choice Act (VCA) in Marin County.

The Marin County Elections Department used a hybrid of the previous precinct system with the VCA system for the 2020 presidential election. They fully implemented the VCA election system for the June 7, 2022, primary and the November 8, 2022, general.

The VCA differs significantly from the precinct system that most voters are accustomed to. In the precinct system, dozens of voting precincts were set up on election day in neighborhood precincts around the county. Voters went to the polling place in their precinct and were given a ballot after verifying their voter qualifications with poll workers. They then cast their votes and submitted their completed ballot for tabulation at the precinct. Results were reported to the Marin County Elections Department for certification and reporting to the Secretary of State (SoS). One could apply for an absentee ballot, which they completed then mailed to the Marin County Elections Department for counting.

In the VCA system, the CA SoS sends every registered voter a Vote-By-Mail (VBM) ballot 29 days before Election Day. Voters can complete their ballot and return it by USPS up until Election Day so long as it is postmarked by 8 pm. Voters may also go to any of 20 regional Vote Centers located throughout the county that begin to open 28 days before Election Day. Voters can drop off their voted VBM ballot at the Vote Centers or vote in person, or if needed register to vote. Voters may also drop off their completed VBM ballots at any of 13 Ballot Drop Boxes placed around the county.

VBM ballots placed in a Drop Box as well as those sent by USPS are sent to the Elections Department at the Civic Center for processing and tabulation. Vote Center "live ballots" are returned to the Civic Center by elections workers for tabulation.

Ballot processing, ballot tabulation, the 1% manual tally and election certification are completed within 31 days after Election Day.

USPS VBM Envelope Processing

The USPS is an integral part of the mass mail-in-ballot election system. The USPS sends Vote-By-Mail ballots from the Marin County Election Officials to every registered voter beginning October 10th, which was 30 days before Election Day. Those white envelopes contained a ballot applicable to a specific precinct as well as a yellow envelope for returning the voted ballot. A sealed and voter-signed yellow envelope is used to return voted ballots by US Mail, or to drop them off at Vote Center, or to deposit them into a Ballot Drop Box.

The yellow envelope includes the name and address of the voter as well as their precinct number. It also includes a space for the mandatory voter signature. The ballots themselves have no traceable identification on them – once separated from the yellow envelope in the Election Department at the Civic Center the person that voted the ballot cannot be identified.

VBM ballots returned by US Mail were first sent to the bulk mail handling facility in San Francisco for post-marking and sorting by county. From there they were sent to the USPS on Bellam Ave in San Rafael. Reportedly, the yellow envelopes were counted by hand at that location to determine postage owed by Marin County. From there the yellow envelopes were sent to the Marin County Election Department at the Civic Center, or to the USPS Post Office at 2 Civic Center Drive, which is across the street from the Marin County Civic Center. It is unclear why the yellow envelopes were sent to the USPS Post Office at 2 Civic Center Drive instead of directly to the Election Department at the Marin County Civic Center. Some observers were told that all ballots are retrieved from the post office and are not delivered by USPS to the Civic Center.

Only those ballots dropped off at Vote Centers or Ballot Drop Boxes no later than 8:00 pm on Election Day as well as those returned by US Mail that are received within 7 days of Election Day and postmarked no later than 8:00 pm Election Day are processed and tabulated.

Election staff begin processing returned ballot envelopes as they're delivered and will sometimes go to the post office to retrieve returned ballots themselves. Chain-of-custody protocols used by election staff when they retrieve ballots from the post office are unclear. The containers and security used are not clear. No one counts the election staff-retrieved ballots when they leave the post office or when they arrive at the Civic Center. It is not completely clear that two election staff always accompany the retrieved ballots.

The USPS protocols for handling undeliverable VBM ballots sent by the Elections Department to all registered voters appear lax as well. Some have asserted that they are returned to the bulk mail facility in San Francisco to attempt to apply forwarding addresses, but it seems more likely that they are returned to the USPS Post Office at 2 Civic Center Drive.

The last AVMR Form 130 dated December 6, 2022, reports 2,518 undeliverable ballots. Some observers were told that they were included with the trays picked up from the post office by election staff. According to the Marin County Registrar of Voters and other election staff, all undeliverable white VBM ballot envelopes are returned to the Marin County Assistant Registrar of Voters.

More research on VBM ballot handling by the USPS is essential to gain an understanding of potential opportunities for injecting fraudulent ballots into the Elections Department for processing and tabulating.

Ballot Drop Box Procedures

A Ballot Drop Box is a secure, well-marked box where voters can return their completed ballot. Voters can return their ballot to any box. Ballot Drop Boxes are serviced by deputized employees of the County Elections Department working in teams of two.

There were 11 outdoor Ballot Drop Boxes available 24/7 plus 1 indoor Ballot Drop Box at the Civic Center available during business hours for the November 8, 2022, general election. All 20 vote centers had a Ballot Drop Box available as well. On Election Day, all Ballot Drop Boxes were to be closed and locked at 8:00 pm.



Figure 1-- Ballot Drop Box at Civic Center

Pick-up frequency was generally every 2 to 4 days and adjusted as needed to accommodate higher volumes. Ballots were to be sealed in secure containers during transport.

Ballot Drop Boxes are constructed in a similar manner to those used by USPS, FedEx, and UPS. Many are bolted on the inside into concrete or secured to an immovable object using industrial strength hardware. The opening is narrow and designed in a way that prevents tampering or retrieval of envelopes. Each Ballot Drop Box is inspected by the pick-up team for damage or evidence of tampering. Local law enforcement agencies were notified of their locations so they could monitor them daily while on patrol.

For the June 7, 2022, primary roughly 25 percent of all ballots received were from Ballot Drop Boxes. It was similar for the November 8, 2022, general election.

The Ballot Drop Box at the Civic Center drive through was the most heavily used drop box, especially on Election Day of the November 8, 2022, general election.

Once all ballots are retrieved and returned to the Civic Center, they are processed in the same manner as VBM ballots sent by US Mail.

Vote Center Procedures

The “Voter’s Choice Act” replaced traditional polling centers with Vote Centers. Voters may cast a ballot in-person at any vote center in their county. Vote centers and polling places are similar, but vote centers provide additional features that make voting easier and more convenient.

At any vote center a voter may:

- Vote in-person,
- Drop off their ballot,
- Get a replacement ballot,
- Vote using an accessible voting machine,
- Get help and voting material in multiple languages, and
- Register to vote or update their voter registration

One Vote Center is required for every 50,000 registered voters starting 10 days before Election Day and through the Friday before Election Day (11-day centers). One Vote Center is required for every 10,000 registered voters starting the Saturday before Election Day and through Election Day (4-day centers).

There are roughly 170,000 registered voters in Marin County. Thus, the number of Vote Centers required by law is (4) 11-day Vote Centers and (18) 4-day Vote Centers. The Marin County Elections Department provides (1) 29-day Vote Center, (3) 11-day Vote Centers and (16) 4-day Vote Centers, which is two more 4-day centers than required by law.

The Marin County Elections Department selects the number and location of Vote Centers based on the California Elections Code and public outreach.

Each Vote Center is staffed by a minimum of two (2) Vote Center Coordinators (Coordinators) and a minimum of three (3) Vote Center Clerks (Clerks).

Vote Center Coordinator Duties

The Elections Department assigns a minimum of two Vote Center Coordinators to each Vote Center. The two Vote Center Coordinators working the 29-day and 11-day Vote Centers are assisted by other Vote Center Coordinators through the Friday before Election Day.

Coordinators are assisted by Vote Center Clerks for the remaining 4 days that Vote Centers are open.

Primary responsibilities of the Vote Center Coordinator (Coordinator) include Vote Center setup, opening, operating, and closing, and assisting voters at the Ballot Marking Device (BMD), facilitating, and directing observers as well as supervising the Vote Center Clerks.

One Coordinator for each Vote Center shall be responsible for one of more of these tasks:

- 1) Take the orange canvas pouch to the vote center each day
- 2) Coordinate entry to the Vote Center with the contact person for the building
- 3) Call the election workers (Vote Center Clerks) assigned to the Vote Center

The orange canvas pouch contains:

- 1) Two (2) voter cards on blue lanyards to activate the BMD
- 2) Security seals for supply cabinet and metal ballot drop box
- 3) Key to supply cabinet
- 4) Key to the so-called Black Ballot Box
- 5) Keys to the exterior VBM Drop Box
- 6) Key to the Vote Center (if available)
- 7) Vote Center Facility Use Form with vote center contact information.

Closing the Vote Center involves announcing that the Vote Center is closed when it is closing time, bring the Exterior Drop Box inside (unless secured by lock and chain), completing a Ballot

Statement, removing ballots from the Black Box and the Exterior Drop Box (with another Coordinator present), and completing the Closing Guide Checklist.

Removing ballots from the Black Ballot Box includes counting and recording Live Ballots and BMD ballot envelopes, packing Live Ballots in the bag for Live Ballots, signing the seal and sealing the bag, placing the sealed bags in the Red Suitcase, counting and recording the green envelopes with Provisional/CVR Ballots on the label of the bag for Provisional/CVR Ballots, writing the total on the Ballot Statement, signing the seal, sealing the bag then putting the bag in the Red Suitcase.

Vote Center Clerk Duties

The Elections Department assigns a minimum of three Vote Center Clerks (Clerks) to each Vote Center. Clerks work at 4-day Vote Centers and take direction from Coordinators. The primary responsibility of the Clerks is to assist voters at the Check-in stations (3), the Mobile Ballot Production stations (2), and the Black Ballot Box (1).

Detailed duties of Vote Center Coordinators and Clerks are provided in Elections Department training materials, Appendix B: "Vote Center Instructions for Coordinators and Election Workers" and Appendix C: "Process Voter Manual."

VBM Ballot Dropoff

A voter may drop off their voted VBM Ballot in a Ballot Drop Box near the entrance of the Vote Center, or in the so-called "Black Ballot Box" near the exit for live, CVR, Provisional and VBM ballots. The voted VBM Ballot should be sealed inside its yellow VBM return envelope and signed by the voter. If a person is dropping off a VBM ballot for another voter, that person must sign the envelope as well.




Figure 2 -- Generic Vote Center Floor Plan

Voter Check In

The voter must check in at 1 of 3 check-in stations inside the Vote Center. A vote center clerk will check their registration status and whether they've already voted.

Voters may take Vote-By-Mail (VBM) ballots with them, but they are not allowed to leave the Vote Center with Live, Provisional, CVR or BMD ballots.

- 1) Voter checks in and provides their name to the clerk
- 2) Voter must provide their address when asked by the clerk
 - a) If the voter is registered and hasn't voted, the clerk issues them a ballot
 - i) If the voter wants to vote in person, the clerk gives them a live ballot
 - ii) If the voter wants to leave with a ballot, the clerk offers them a VBM ballot
 - b) If the voter is registered and has already voted, but claims that they haven't voted, the clerk will offer them a Provisional ballot

- c) If the voter is not registered, the clerk will offer them a conditional voter registration (CVR)
- 3) If the voter needs a live ballot, the clerk prints a label and gives it to the voter
- 4) If the voter needs a VBM ballot, the clerk prints a label, sticks it on a yellow VBM envelope then gives the voter that envelope
- 5) If the voter needs a Provisional ballot, the clerk prints a label, sticks it on a green Provisional/CVR envelope then gives the voter that envelope
- 6) If the voter needs a Conditional Voter Registration ballot, the clerk will:
 - a) ask the voter for ID (see below for acceptable ID)
 - b) print a label, sticks it on a green Provisional/CVR envelope
 - c) gives the voter the envelope
- 7) The clerk will then direct the voter to:
 - a) a Mobile Ballot Production station or
 - b) a Ballot Marking Device station




Figure 3 -- Vote Center Check-in Laptop and Label Printer




Figure 4 – Check-in Laptop Voter Search Screen

Mobile Ballot Production Station

If the voter chooses the Mobile Ballot Production Station the clerk will print a ballot for the precinct shown on the label presented by the voter

- 1) For a live ballot the clerk will:
 - a) give the voter their ballot, as well as a secrecy folder and a pen
 - b) affix their label to the Live Ballot Signature Log
 - c) ask the voter to sign their name on the log next to their label
 - d) mark a tally on the Daily Ballot Printed Tally Sheet for live ballots
- 2) For a VBM ballot the clerk will:
 - a) fold their ballot and place it into their yellow envelope
 - b) return their yellow envelope with label and folded ballot inside
 - c) direct voter to place their voted ballot in the yellow VBM envelope, sign it, then return it to a drop box or a vote center or by mail by Election Day
 - d) mark a tally on the Daily Ballot Printed Tally Sheet for VBM ballots
- 3) For a Provisional/CVR ballot the clerk will:

- a) give the voter their folded ballot and a pen
- b) direct the voter to complete side one of the green Provisional/CVR envelope while in the voting booth, then place their voted ballot inside the envelope
- c) mark a tally on the Daily Ballot Printed Tally Sheet for Provisional/CVR ballots



Figure 5 -- Mobile Ballot Printers in Storage Cage

Ballot Marking Device Station

If the voter chooses the Ballot Marking Device Station (BMD), the clerk will escort them to the station and print a ballot for the precinct shown on the label presented by the voter

- 1) For a live ballot the clerk will:
 - a) write the precinct number on the BMD envelope
 - b) affix their label to the Live Ballot Signature Log
 - c) ask the voter to sign their name on the log next to their label
 - d) explain the BMD to the voter and offer Vote Center Coordinator assistance

- e) after voting, print the voted BMD ballot and give the voter a BMD envelope
 - f) direct the voter to place their voted ballot inside the envelope then put the envelope in the top slot of the “Black Box” near the exit
 - g) mark a tally on the BMD Daily Ballot Printed Tally Sheet for live ballots
- 2) For a Provisional/CVR ballot the clerk will:
- a) explain the BMD to the voter
 - b) offer to have a Vote Center Coordinator assist them
 - c) direct the voter to place their voted ballot inside the envelope then put the envelope in the top slot of the “Black Box” near the exit
 - d) mark a tally on the BMD Daily Ballot Printed Tally Sheet for Provisional/CVR ballots




Figure 6 -- Ballot Marking Device Printer, Screen and Control

A voter may have a friend or relative assist them at a BMD station. The voter may also request assistance at a BMD station from one of the Vote Center Coordinators.



Figure 7 -- ROV Lynda Roberts with Ballot Marking Device Station

Acceptable Identification Documents

The only time an election worker may ask a voter for identification is when the voter needs to register to vote and requires a Conditional Voter Registration (CVR) ballot. The type of ID acceptable are current and valid photo ID or documents that include the name and address of the individual and is dated after the date of the previous even year November Election.

- 1) Current and valid photo ID
 - a) driver's license or identification card of any state
 - b) passport
 - c) employee ID card
 - d) membership card, such as Costco card
 - e) military ID card
 - f) student ID card
 - g) health club ID card
 - h) insurance plan ID card
 - i) any ID card issued by a government agency
- 2) Documents with the voter's name and address dated after November 7, 2020
 - a) utility bill

- b) bank statement
- c) government check
- d) government paycheck
- e) any document issued by a government agency
- f) sample ballot of other official elections document issued by a governmental agency dated before the election
- g) voter notification card issued by a governmental agency
- h) vehicle registration issued by a governmental agency

Voted Ballot Delivery

All voted ballots are sent to the Civic Center. VBM ballots are returned in yellow envelopes that are signed and sealed by the voter. Those ballots are subject to signature verification, checking whether the voter already voted, ballot extraction, unfolding, inspection, adjudication, and ballot tabulation. “Live” ballots received from Vote Centers are unfolded and returned to the Civic Center for ballot tabulation only since the checking whether the voter was registered and had not voted already was verified at the Vote Center.

The Elections Department will research Provisional/CVR ballot envelopes to determine if the voter is eligible to vote and hasn’t already voted before tabulating those ballots.

Civic Center Ballot Processing Procedures

The “Voter’s Choice Act” requires all ballots to be delivered to the Marin County Civic Center for processing and tabulation. That is a significant change from the precinct election system in which voter ID verification and tabulation of voted ballots occurred at the precinct level with results reported to the ROV on Election Day. Instead of approximately 600 poll workers needed on Election Day, roughly 150 are now needed for a month or more. By pursuing greater VBM voting, critical counting controls are taken away from precinct workers. The verification of thousands of ballots is placed in the simultaneous control of 4 or 5 trained elections workers at a time and spread out over days, rather than being handled on single election day by hundreds of precinct workers.

Precincts

There were 87 distinct ballots used for 137 precincts for the November 2022 general election. All ballots contained the same statewide and countywide races, propositions, and measures but had different local races and measures at the precinct level.

Table 1 – Precincts by Supervisor District and City/Town Code

Precincts for November 2022 General Election by Supervisor District					City/Town Code
District 1	District 2	District 3	District 4	District 5	
10901, 10902,	20301, 20302,	30101, 30202,	40201, 40202,	50601, 50602,	01 – Belvedere
10903, 10904,	10403, 20404,	30503, 30504,	40203, 40404,	50603, 50604,	02 – Corte Madera
10905, 10906,	20405, 20406,	30505, 30506,	40405, 40506,	50605, 50606,	03 – Fairfax
10907, 10908,		30507, 31008,	40507, 40608,	50607, 50608,	
10909, 10910,	20407, 20708,	31009, 31110,	40609, 40610,	50609, 50610,	04 – Larkspur
10911, 10912,	20709, 20710,	31111, 31112,	40611, 40612,	50611, 50612,	
10913, 10914,	20811, 20812,	31113, 31114,	40913, 40914,	50613, 51214,	05 – Mill Valley
10915, 11216,	20813, 20814,	31115, 31216,	40915, 40916,	51215, 51216,	
11217, 11218,	20815, 20916,	31217, 31218,	40917, 40918,	51217, 51218	06 – Novato
11219, 11220,	20917, 20918,	31219, 31220,	40919, 40920,		
11221, 11222	20919, 21220,	31221, 31222,	41221, 41222,		07 – Ross
	21221, 21222,	31223, 31224,	41223, 41224,		
	21223, 21224,	31225, 31226,	41225, 41226,		08 – San Anselmo
	21225, 21226,	31227	41227, 41228,		
	21227		41229, 41230,		09 – San Rafael
			41231, 41232,		
			41233, 41234,		10 – Sausalito
			41235, 41236,		
			41237, 41238,		11 – Tiburon
			41239, 41240,		
			41241, 41242,		12 – Unincorporated
			41243		

Regular precinct numbering uses a 5-digit code. The first digit represents the Supervisor District (41243), the next two digits represent the city or town (41243) and the last two digits are the sequential number of precincts in the district (41243).

All voted ballots sent to Civic Center

Vote-by-mail (VBM) ballots are returned in yellow envelopes that are signed and sealed by the voter. Those ballots are subject to signature verification, voted status of the voter, sorting by precinct and ballot tabulation among other things.

“Live” ballots received from Vote Centers are returned to the Civic Center for ballot tabulation only since the ID and voted status of the voter were verified at the Vote Center.




Figure 8 -- Basement Room L-21

Ballot processing starts in Rm. L-21 in the basement of the Civic Center. Processing begins when the Elections Department starts receiving VBM ballots by mail and “live” ballots from Vote

Centers. The ballot tabulators in Rm. L-21 are used for tabulating the “live” ballots. Tabulators in Rm. 121 are used for tabulating all ballots extracted from the yellow VBM envelopes.

The general ballot processing sequence is as follows:

1. Intake VBM ballots and live ballots in Rm. L-21
2. Prepare VBM envelopes for sorting
3. First sort
 - a. Check voted status of voter
 - b. Verify voter signature
 - c. Unchallenged VBM envelopes remain in sorter output tray #1 of 16
4. Second sort
 - a. VBM envelopes that remain challenged after digital signature verification are sorted into separate tray for sending to manual signature verification
 - b. Unchallenged VBM envelopes are sorted into groups of precincts
5. Third sort
 - a. Prep envelopes and cut open bottom edge
 - b. Sort opened envelopes by precinct
 - c. VBM envelopes that remain challenged aren't cut open or sorted by precinct; they're identified as challenged and stored separately in secure containers
6. Opened VBM envelopes are removed from sorter trays and sent up to Rm. 121 or adjacent offices for ballot extraction and inspection.
 - a. Extraction. Election staff in teams of 2 to 4 extract voted ballots from the envelopes, unfold them, and stack them into piles of 50.
 - b. Envelope storage. The empty yellow envelopes with voter information on them are stored in a secure container for a minimum of 22 months.
 - c. Inspection. The extracted and unfolded ballots are inspected for damage, red ink or pencil votes, bleed-through ink (Sharpie) or stray ink marks that could inhibit ballot tabulation. Voted ballots so affected are then sent for adjudication.

- d. Adjudication. Two election staff work together to “cure” or “duplicate” ballots. They either “cure” the ballot by writing in black over votes made with red ink or pencil, or “duplicate” the ballot if it is physically damaged or has bleed-throughs and excessive stray marks. A supervisor is consulted in the event the two disagree on the intent of the voter.
7. Tabulation. All ballots are run through Dominion tabulators to read and record votes for every contest on voted ballots. There were 87 distinct ballots or “precincts” for the November 8, 2022, general election and tabulation is specific to each precinct. There is no identification of the voter or the precinct on the voted ballots.
8. Storage. Both VBM envelopes and ballots are stored.
9. 1% Manual Tally. Before certifying the vote, elections staff perform a manual tally of votes on 1% or more of the ballots.
10. Recount. There are no automatic “triggered” recounts in the State of California. Ballots are organized by precincts to facilitate recounts. Recounts are paid for by candidates or advocates and it was shared that the costs could exceed \$40,000.00

Ballot Intake

VBM ballots arrive in secure mail bags. About 66 percent of the total ballots received are delivered via the USPS. They are delivered by USPS employees or retrieved by elections staff that go to the post office across the street or to the post office on Bellam. About 25 percent of the total ballots received are delivered by elections staff that retrieve them from Ballot Drop Boxes, place them in blue canvas containers, and deliver them to Rm. L-21 at the Civic Center.

Some observers were told that all VBM ballot envelopes sent through the post office are retrieved by election staff and that there are always two staff with the ballots. There is no count when picked up from the post office and matched against a count when they arrive at the Civic Center. They are not in secure trays, but in open trays with the ballot envelopes secured by a large rubber band as explained by an election staff member. Some observers reported that election staff on a few occasions appeared to be returning alone with trays of VBM ballot envelopes.

Live ballots account for about 8 percent of the total ballots received and arrive in secure blue canvas containers delivered to the Civic Center from Vote Centers by Vote Center Coordinators after the Vote Centers close.

Ballot Sorting

VBM envelopes are first prepared for sorting by orienting each envelope so that the voter's signature is in the same position as all the others in the stack to be sorted.

The sorter is in the basement of the Civic Center in the corner of Rm. L-21. It has an input tray in front on its left side and 16 output trays on its right side, 8 in front that can be readily observed and 8 in back that cannot be observed because they can be seen from a secure area only.

The sorter is capable of scanning envelopes to identify the voter and to verify the voter's signature, then sort those envelopes into 1 of 16 trays. It is also capable of cutting the envelopes open. Signature verification requires the sorter to be connected to the Elections Department LAN (local area network). The voter ID and voter voted status requires access to live voter rolls, which in turn requires access to the LAN and possibly the Internet.

A live voter roll is one that is updated whenever a voter's VBM ballot is scanned or whenever a voter receives a ballot print ticket at a Vote Center. That voter roll is managed by DFM Associates software and is accessible by the sorter, the tabulators, the tabulator servers, and every laptop used to check in voters at Vote Centers. DFM software is used in many California counties (43) but does not currently appear on the approved technology list to be used in California. Appendix D shows the technologies used by each county in California. Appendix H shows the voting technologies approved for use in California.

First sort

Election staff in Rm. L-21 takes VBM envelopes as they are received from intake. They then prepare them for sorting by arranging the envelopes such that their voter signatures are oriented the same way and face the same direction.

They're then loaded into the sorter, which checks the voted status of the voter and verifies the signature of the voter. VBM envelopes from voters that have already voted are rejected and sorted into a separate output tray. The voter signatures of the remaining VBM envelopes are then verified.

Scanning accuracy is set such that only 25% of the remaining VBM envelopes are accepted, which are then sorted into Tray #1. The remaining 75% of VBM envelopes with challenged signatures are sorted into other trays.

Digital Signature Verification

The digitized signatures of signature challenged VBM envelopes are sent from the sorter over the Elections Department LAN to five workstations in Rm. 121. Each workstation presents 4 digitized signatures from the sorter with 4 digitized signatures on file. Elections staff compare individual signatures from the sorter with those on file and approve those they verify. The others remain challenged and are identified so that they can be pulled by the second sort and sent for manual signature verification.

Second sort

The second sort removes VBM envelopes that remain signature challenged, checks the voted status of the voter, and sorts the VBM envelopes into precinct groups.

VBM envelopes that were signature challenged after the first sort are removed from their output tray and fed into the sorter input tray for a second sort. The voted status of remaining VBM envelopes is checked and those from voters that already voted are rejected and sorted into a separate output tray. The remaining VBM envelopes are then sorted into output trays for precinct groups. Those groups are then sorted into individual groups during the third sort.

Manual Signature Verification

The VBM envelopes that remain challenged after digital signature verification are pulled from their sorter output tray and placed into loose trays then sent for manual signature verification. It is unclear where manual signature verification occurs, or how VBM envelopes manually

verified are returned for sorting, or what happens to the VBM envelopes that fail manual verification.

Third sort

The third sort checks the voted status of the voter, cuts the VBM envelope open and sorts the opened VBM envelopes into individual precincts. The opened VBM envelopes are removed from the trays and placed into a container organized by precinct and labeled. The containers with opened VBM envelopes are then sent to Rm. 121 for ballot extraction and inspection.

VBM envelopes that remain challenged aren't cut open or sorted by precinct; they're identified as challenged and stored separately in secure containers.

Ballot Extraction and Inspection

This task occurred in Rm. 126 across the hall from Rm. 121. Elections staff work in teams of 2 to 4 to prepare for voted ballot tabulation. Extraction entails removing the voted ballots from VBM envelopes, then unfolding and stacking them. Inspection entails inspecting the voted ballots for machine legibility. Votes made in red ink or in pencil are sent to adjudication for "curing." Voted ballots that are physically damaged or have Sharpie pen bleed-throughs are sent to adjudication for "duplication."

Adjudication

Teams of 2 elections staff work together to "cure" ballots by overwriting votes in red ink or pencil with a black or blue pen, to "duplicate" damaged ballots by copying votes from the damaged ballot to a new replacement ballot. The teams work at tables in Rm. 121 while their "curing" and "duplication" efforts are shown on large displays on a wall behind the tables.

All ballots with write-in votes are sent for adjudication to verify that the write-in name is from an approved list of write-in candidates.

Envelope storage

After the voted ballots are extracted, the empty yellow VBM envelopes with voter ID, precinct and signature are stored for a minimum of 22 months. Envelopes are sorted by precinct and secured with a rod running through pre-punched holes in the envelopes. The envelopes with rods are placed in a container and the rods are secured to the container. A top is secured to the container, which is then placed on a rack that is stored in a locked room. There appeared to be roughly 24 containers on the rack, which would be adequate for 120,000 empty yellow ballot envelopes.

Tabulation

Live Ballots. These are ballots from Vote Centers where voters went to vote in person. They can be distinguished from VBM ballots in that they are flat without fold creases. It remains unclear when they are subjected to ballot inspection or where they are adjudicated. They are eventually assembled by elections staff into stacks of 50 and stored in containers of 500 when ready for tabulation. Election staff said only the 5 tabulators in Rm. L-21 are used to tabulate live ballots election night. It remains unclear whether any are tabulated before Election Day.

Some observers reported when they asked if live ballots were counted before election day, election staff told them on occasions “yes” and at other times “no.” Furthermore, it appears that one of the three (3) tabulators in Rm. 121 was used to tabulate ballots as reported in the 1% manual audit. Many live ballots were tabulated after 8:00 pm on Election Day.

VBM ballots. After extraction, inspection and adjudication, these unfolded ballots with creases are assembled into stacks of 50 and stored in containers of 500 ballots when ready for tabulation. Only the three tabulators in Rm. 121 are used to tabulate voted VBM ballots. Up to 24 containers are stored in a single cage. Cages are then locked in a secure area in Rm. 121 until they are retrieved and each cage’s ballots are run through tabulators in Rm. 121.

It remains unclear how the tabulators determine which precinct they're tabulating. Is it set by elections staff before running a batch of ballots, or does the tabulator determine the precinct from the layout of the ballot?

Ballot storage

VBM voted ballots are sorted by precinct and stored in containers of 500. Containers may contain groups of voted ballots from multiple precincts. Live ballots are stored separately in containers of 500 and are sorted by Vote Center. Voted live ballots are not sorted by precinct.

1% Manual Tally

Part of the canvassing period after Election Day includes the 1% Manual Tally of voted ballots. Ballots selected for the 1% tally are based on a random draw. The tabulation of all live ballots is completed the evening of Election Day, so live ballots are the first subjected to the manual tally. The 1% manual tally of VBM ballots occurs after tabulation of all VBM ballots is complete.

The 1% manual tally procedures are governed by California Elections Code (EC) 15290, which refers to the precinct tally process described in EC 15276 and EC 15277. One elections staff member reads results from the voted ballots while another confirms the votes as they're read. At least two other elections staff members keep a tally of votes as they are read and confirmed.

Manual tally results must be reconciled with machine counts.

Recount

There are no automatic recounts in California, even if the difference in a contest is only one vote. Those requesting a recount must do so within 5 days of vote certification and pay for that recount before the Elections Department conducts one.

No recounts were requested or observed for the November 8, 2022, general election.

Marin Election Integrity Committee

The Election Integrity Committee (EIC) was an ad hoc subcommittee of the Marin County Republican Central Committee (MCRCC). The purpose of the subcommittee was to find and report on voting and election irregularities in Marin County. Achieving that goal required research, training, coordination, observing and reporting.

The MCRCC did not renew the ad hoc committee after its January 2023 Organizational Meeting. The subcommittee's efforts were interrupted for that reason and work on their report ceased.

Marin Election Integrity Committee (MEIC)

To continue the important work of election integrity in Marin County, a county recipient committee was created on December 23, 2022. The new organization was named the "Marin Election Integrity Committee" and has FPPC ID #1456997. .

MEIC Website

The website of the Marin Election Integrity Committee is:

<https://www.mymaringop.org/>

That site will be used to recruit, train and schedule observers for the March 5, 2024, primary election. Reports related to election integrity, including this report, are posted on that website.

MEIC Financial and Technical Support

This comprehensive report was completed with the financial and technical assistance provided by the MEIC. The report is composed of intellectual property that is copyrighted by the MEIC or the individuals that developed the material with all rights reserved. It will be published and distributed by the Marin Election Integrity Committee (MEIC) and the individuals that contributed to its content.

Research

Members of the MEIC obtained data from a variety of sources and performed analyses on their own time and at their own cost. Although members were very much aware of other election integrity efforts around the country, that work was used for educational purposes only. The information provided in this report is based solely on official data acquired from the California Secretary of State (SoS) and the Marin County Registrar of Voters (ROV). All conclusions drawn were developed through analyses of that data by MEIC members.

Trends

Past voter rolls and election results were analyzed to establish trends, which is a well-recognized method of highlighting anomalies that suggest election fraud.

California Secretary of State Data

Results of past Marin County elections were obtained from the election page of the (SoS):

<https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections>

Scroll down to “Additional Resources” and select “Elections Statistics +.” Note that the SoS presents data in such a way that makes it far more voluminous than necessary which in turn makes it very difficult to identify and isolate the data sought for analysis.

Marin County Registered Voters Files Data

Only the latest (June 2022) voter registration file was made available to the MCRCC EI Committee. The ROV is required by state law to provide updated files to the Secretary of State several times a year. In odd-numbered years, the registered voters file as of February 10 must be provided to the Secretary of State by March 1. In even-numbered years they must provide updates 135 days, 50 days, and 7 days before the primary, and 102 days, 50-days, and 7 days before the general.

Table 2 – Dates Registered Voters Files Must Be Updated

E-0	March 5, 2024	November 5, 2024
E-135	October 22, 2023	
E-123		July 5, 2024
E-102		July 26, 2024 (*)
E-60	January 5, 2024	September 6, 2024
E-50	January 15, 2024 (*)	September 16, 2024 (*)
E-15	February 19, 2024	October 21, 2024
E-7	February 27, 2024 (*)	October 29, 2024 (*)
Odd-Numbered Year	March 1 for those registered by February 10	

(*) As of date in row immediately above.

The above table shows the dates that the Marin Elections Department must send updated registered voters files to the SoS for 2024.

Marin County Elections Department Data

Marin County election data was obtained from the county's election page at:

<https://www.marincounty.org/depts/rv>

Voter registration information may be purchased from Marin County using forms available from this website:

<https://marincounty.org/depts/rv/voter-registration/purchasing>

Completed forms, identification, and the application fees (check or cash only) should be submitted in person to the elections department in Rm. 121 at the Marin County Civic Center.

Historical California Election Statistics

Party vote capture percentages obtained from Congressional website [8]. CA historical voter registration statistics obtained from California Secretary of State [9]. See References.

Election Integrity Website

The Marin Election Integrity Committee developed its own website to facilitate its efforts:

<https://www.mymaringop.org/>

That website is used to recruit, train and schedule observers for the 2024 presidential primary and presidential general elections.

Signups

Anyone can use the Subscription form on the MEIC website to be added to our email list and be kept abreast of meeting times, meeting agendas, observer training opportunities and significant events related to Marin County election integrity. Full membership on the committee is limited and requires an invitation from at least three full Members. Candidates will then be subjected to an interview and a majority vote to become a full Member.

Observer Training Materials

The MEIC has reviewed extensive observer training materials developed by others such as the Sonoma County GOP Central Committee, the CA GOP, the RNC and the non-partisan Election Integrity Project – CA. Members then developed observer training materials specific to Marin County based on the “Voter’s Choice Act” election system.

Our observer training materials were updated based on knowledge acquired from further research and our own recent election observation experiences. These training materials include:

- PPTX and PDF versions of our online courses
- Observation Checklists
 - Ballot Drop Boxes,
 - Vote Centers and
 - Ballot Processing
- Observer Protocols

- Observer Rights

We anticipate further updates to the Vote Center and Ballot Processing observer training materials based on knowledge acquired observing the November 8, 2022 general election.

Observer Training Classes

The EI Committee created three online observer training courses for 1) Ballot Drop Boxes, 2) Vote Centers, and 3) Ballot Processing at the Civic Center. Classes for those courses ranged in duration from 60 minutes for Ballot Drop Boxes to 90 minutes for Ballot Processing.

A total of 12 live online classes were given in September and October of 2022, or four classes for each of three courses. The same classes will be offered by the MEIC in the months prior to the March 5, 2024 primary election as shown in the table below:

Table 3 – Observer Training Courses and Dates for the March 5, 2024 Election

Course	First/Third Dates	Second/Fourth Dates
Ballot Drop Boxes	January 9, 2024	January 18, 2024
Vote Centers	January 11, 2024	January 23, 2024
Ballot Processing	January 16, 2024	January 25, 2024
Ballot Drop Boxes	February 6, 2024	February 15, 2024
Vote Centers	February 8, 2024	February 20, 2024
Ballot Processing	February 13, 2024	February 22, 2024

Updated observer training courses, checklists, protocols, and rights will be available to download in Microsoft PowerPoint (PPTX) and Adobe Acrobat (PDF) formats from our website.

Poll Workers and Ballot Processing Representatives

The Election Integrity Committee found that qualified county central committees are entitled by state law to designate ballot processing representatives and to nominate poll workers. An Alternate Member was proposed to be the designated MCRCC Ballot Processing Representative but a resolution was never passed. The MCRCC also nominated six other Members to become poll workers. One nominee was eventually appointed as a Vote Center Clerk while two others became alternates for that position. All received Vote Center training from the Marin ROV, training that became a valuable source of knowledge for developing future observer training materials.

In addition to providing thorough analyses of Registered Voters Files and past elections results, one report contributor observed Ballot Processing at the Civic Center for several days logging several hours beginning October 10, 2022, and continued through Election Day and after until the vote was certified on December 5, 2022. -The observer performed hundreds of hours of analyses after the 2020 election and added days observing ballot processing at the Marin County Civic Center during the November 2022 election, bringing this experience to analyzing election results of the November 2022 general election.

Three other election observers received 3-hour Vote Center training from the Marin County ROV. One served as poll worker for the November 8, 2022, general election while the other two were alternates in reserve (but didn't serve). The poll worker worked three 10-hour days at a Vote Center in Mill Valley before Election Day and 14 hours on Election Day.

Elections Observed

June 7, 2022, Primary Election

Election Integrity Committee members provided dozens of hours observing Ballot Drop Boxes, dozens of hours observing Vote Centers and dozens of hours observing the 1% manual tally at the Civic Center before the vote was certified in early July 2022. The Election Integrity Committee was still in its infancy, but the primary proved to be a valuable training exercise.

November 8, 2022, General Election

Members of the Election Integrity Committee filled over seventy 3-hour regular shifts to observe ballot processing at the Marin Civic Center. Near Election Day many members filled extended hour shifts that occurred between 7:30 am through 6:00 pm weekdays and weekends.


Twenty-one (21) unique observers filled the bulk of these shifts. One observer deserves special attention for filling over 20 three-hour shifts to date. A second observer filled over a dozen 3-hour shifts. A third observer has also been a constant presence at the Civic Center along with her a friend. All made significant observations that lead to several great questions of the ROV.

Notable Findings:

A thorough evaluation of voter rolls, observer reports and the processes used by the Marin County Elections Department identified several vulnerabilities that enable election fraud.

Republican Registrations

The number of Marin County voters registered as Republican continues to decline while the percentage of California voters registered as Republican remains relatively steady.




Source: California Secretary of State

Figure 9 – Marin County and CA Republican Registration 1990 – 2022 midterms

Impact of Electronic Voting Systems on Election Results

Does the use of electronic voting systems have an impact on election results in the state of California? Judging by the chart below, which is a historical evaluation of the California delegation of US House races going back to 1960, the answer is “yes.” The change in the percentage of votes captured by Democrats [8] was mapped against the change in percentage of eligible voters registered as Democrats [9].

An overlay of those two historical graphs yielded a few interesting observations. First, despite the decline of percentage Democrat registrations from 57% in 1960 to 46% in 2020, the percentage of votes captured by Democrats increased from 54% in 1960 to 67% in 2020. Another observation was that except for 1974, the percentage of votes captured by Democrats was below the percentage of voters registered Democrat. This indicates that though voters register for a party, their votes were not always dictated by the political views and expressions of the candidate, and just a party vote. The Watergate years of 1973-1976 definitely benefited Democrats.



Source: United States House of Representatives and the California Secretary of State

Figure 10 -- DEM% Registration v. DEM% Results Over Time

Also, as one would expect, the Democrat percentage of the vote dipped when former Senator Nixon (R-CA) and former CA Governor Reagan ran for president in 1968 and 1980, respectively. There was another slight dip in 1994 when Republicans led by Newt Gingrich retook the US House for the first time in decades, also as one would expect. But there is a distinct inversion of that relationship starting about 1996. The percentage of votes captured by Democrats began to

exceed the percentage of voters registered Democrat. That percentage climbed steadily from 50% in 1996 to 67% in 2020 while the percentage of eligible voters registered Democrat declined to 46%. That 21-point discrepancy cannot be explained by libertarians and independents alone, even if all of them voted for Democrats.

In 1998, only 4% of California election votes were exposed to electronic voting systems processing. After the 2000 Gore v. Bush debacle, there was an impetus to avoid the humiliation of “hanging chads.” The implementation of electronic voting accelerated in California particularly after the passing by Congress 2002 the Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which required the moved away from using punch card to record votes. By 2004, 88% of California counties vote processing was exposed to electronic voting systems; and by 2020, it was 100%.

Overlaying the historical implementation of electronic voting systems onto the percentage of Democrat registrations and the percentage of votes captured by Democrats, a stunning trend emerges. As these electronic systems came online the percentage of vote captured by Democrats increased while their percentage of registered voters declined, an inverse relationship of what one would expect. As more electronic voting systems came online the percentage of votes captured by Democrats accelerated. We now see that they capture 67% of the vote with only 46% of the registered voters, which represents an overperformance of 21percentage points.

We see a similar relationship in Marin County for recent presidential elections. Although the percent of registered voters registered Democrat for the 2020 presidential is roughly 60%, Marin Democrats consistently capture about 75% to +80%of the vote for four presidential elections (2008, 2012, 2016and 2020). (The American Independent (2.4%), Libertarian (0.7%), and No Party Preference (21.8%voters account for approximately 25% of the 2020 registered Marin voters.)

Something else is pulling votes to Democrats beyond what would be expected from registrations.

Inactive Voters

The answer from the ROV regarding “inactive voters” is as inexplicable as is it inconsistent. For example, if you move to another county and register there, your Marin County registration becomes “inactive.” Why are you not removed from the voter rolls? A better explanation is needed!

Deceased Voters

Voters remain on the voter rolls as “Canceled” after they are deceased. It is unclear why they remain, how long they remain in that status after death or what finally triggers their removal.

Chain-of-Custody Lapses

There is a serious “chain of custody” problem when elections staff go to retrieve trays of loose yellow mail-in voted ballots, sometimes by only a single staff member. A more secure recording of who and when ballots were retrieved from the USPS should be posted on a list tracking pickups available the next day after ballots are retrieved for public inspection. In addition, without a proper accounting by the USPS of undeliverable white VBM envelopes, the opportunities for the fraudulent collecting, completing, and submitting of those ballots is significant.

ROV staff claimed for several days that the sorter did not give a count of the ballots sorted. We learned from another observer that the AVMR130 report they gave had the count we requested. We now obtain a count produced by the sorter daily. The AVMR130 accounting was repeatedly told to election observer to include only the sorter count of VBM ballots.

Dual Registration Files

Some observers registered with their full middle name received official election mail with their full middle name and other election materials with only their middle initial. That suggests that two voter rolls might exist, the one we all know about that includes full middle names (List A) – about half of registered voters – and another with middle initials (List B) used as a secondary mailing list as explain by ROV personnel.

The existence of two voter rolls opens the door to election system mishaps with significant impacts.

Both the Marin County Registrar of Voters and the Assistant Registrar of Voters confirmed the existence of a second registered voter mailing list to election observers. They maintained that it is created and used by vendors.

60-40 Ratio

Looking at the US House of Representatives seat for the congressional districts that cover Marin County and Sonoma County, an inexplicable and statistically improbable 40-60 ratio of Democrat only results is observed. An examination of past election results for US House seats (considering DEM votes only) shows that Marin County always provides 40% of the DEM vote total while Sonoma County always provides 60% of the DEM vote total.

District Votes	CD	2010 M		CD	2012 P		2014 M		2016 P		2018 M		2020 P		2021 RC			
		DEM	REP		DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP	DEM	REP		
Candidate		Woolsey	Judd		Huffman	Roberts	Huffman	Mensing	Huffman	Mensing	Huffman	Mensing	Huffman	Mensing	No	Yes		
Marin	D6	76,757	30,129	D2	98,470	29,410	68,775	15,994	110,165	22,591	107,005	20,700	124,729	25,363				
Sonoma		95,459	47,232		62,872	24,142	46,829	15,042	69,572	21,311	69,247	20,028	85,568	26,296				
Candidate		Thompson	Hanks		Thompson	Loftin	Thompson	Hinton	Thompson	Santamaria	Thompson	Mills	Thompson	Giblin				
Sonoma	D1	18,452	8,571	D5	86,518	28,969	57,060	18,190	95,625	28,734	91,142	21,387	117,430	34,039				
County Votes																		
Marin		76,757	30,129		98,470	29,410	68,775	15,994	110,165	22,591	107,005	20,700	124,729	25,363	108,599	24,273		
Sonoma		113,911	55,803		149,390	53,111	103,889	33,232	165,197	50,045	160,389	41,415	202,998	60,335	160,602	57,419		
County %																		
Marin		40.26%	35.06%		39.73%	35.64%	39.83%	32.49%	40.01%	31.10%	40.02%	33.33%	38.06%	29.60%	40.34%	29.71%		
Sonoma		59.74%	64.94%		60.27%	64.36%	60.17%	67.51%	59.99%	68.90%	59.98%	66.67%	61.94%	70.40%	59.66%	70.29%		
National Trend																		
Outside CA Δ		R +64			D +4			R +14			D +6			D +34			R +10	
Inside CA Δ		zero			D +4			D +1			zero			D +7			*R + 4	
Legend:		Change			Constant			National REP influence			National DEM trend							
		Δ: US House of Representatives Seat Change																
		*: First election in which Republicans have taken a US House of Representative seat from a CA Democrat since 1998 (election over election)																

Sources: Marin County Elections Department and the California Secretary of State

Figure 11 – The Consistent and Improbable 60-40 Ratio

It doesn't matter who is on the ballot, what the national trend is, how the demographics between the two counties change over time or how many people voted in the election. Marin always provides 40% of the DEM total and Sonoma always provides 60%.

Ballot Harvesting

Although legal in California, ballot harvesting along with mass mailing and lax signature verification enables and opens possible voting access to unscrupulous voters to vote in the name of others.

USPS Handling of Vote-By-Mail Ballots

The handling of Vote-By-Mail (VBM) ballots by the US Post Office is an essential part of ballot processing, but it lacks the security measures one would expect to maintain a proper inventory of those ballots and a proper chain-of-custody. We also lack rights to observe any of the ballot processing at the USPS, a critical election step for observing proper ballot collection and control.

(Security breaches in ballot processing do happen. Example, observers have witnessed the adjudication process, which is required that 2 non-staff people decide the voter's intent, being done by a single person.)

Disenfranchisement of Vote Center Voters

The Election Integrity Committee uncovered evidence that 7,947 voters that voted at Vote Centers were disenfranchised, and their ballots excluded from the certified results. The evidence consists of official data provided by the Marin County Elections Department during the canvassing period after Election Day.

The number of VBM ballots were reported on AVMR130 forms. Several observers reported that they were told by election staff on several occasions that those forms reported VBM ballots only. "Good" ballots are verified VBM ballots.

"In-person" ballots are from voters that voted in person at Vote Centers and may include Provisional or Conditional Voter Registration ballots as well. The ROV refers to these ballots as "live" ballots. Only yellow VBM envelopes with voted ballots sealed inside are run through the sorter at the Civic Center. They include VBM ballots returned by US Mail and those dropped off at a Vote Center or placed in a Ballot Drop Box.

12/6/2022 AVMR130 Form, Good, 3:39:43 PM		(Vote-By-Mail Ballots)
Total VBM (Sorted) Ballots:		120,585
Vote Center Ballots as reported for 1% manual tally		(In-Person Ballots)
Total Poll-2 Tabulated In-Person Ballots:		5,046
Total Poll-4, 5, 6, 8 Tabulated In-Person Ballots:		3,718
Total Vote Center (In-Person) Ballots:		8,764
12/5/2022 11:10:36 AM, Certified by Marin ROV		
Sum of In-Person and VBM Ballots:		129,349
Total Ballots per Certified Vote:		121,402
<i>In-Person plus VBM minus Certified Ballots:</i>	<i>How?</i>	7,947

Source: Marin County Elections Department

Figure 12 -- Live Ballots Excluded from Total

The number of VBM envelopes processed are reported on AVMR Forms that elections staff printed routinely and provided to election observers daily upon request. These forms report the cumulative VBM ballots returned by party and the ballot return status. Return status is broken down by (signature) challenged, good and undeliverable. On several occasions it was reported by election staff that AVMR reports do not include “live” ballots from Vote Centers which are not subject to signature verification or sorting by precinct.

The in-person or “live” ballot tally came from 1% manual tally data provided by the Elections Department. (The dice roll to select the ballots that would be tallied occurred on November 27, 2022.) The actual tally was conducted on November 28, 2022.

See Attachment G – 1% Manual Tally of Vote Center Ballots for the number of ballots from each vote center.

Tabulation Delays

The Elections Department stopped tabulating ballots on Friday, Saturday, and Sunday (November 11, 12 and 13) after Election Day. They attributed that delay to the need for their Election Information Systems Technician to take a break. That was thought to be unusual given that those days are the ones in which elections staff are most needed to bring the election

tabulation to a timely end. The Election Department otherwise remained fully staffed during that time. Not only did there appear to be thousands of ballots ready to tabulate, but also there appeared to be other trained staff members on hand to run the tabulators.

Early Vote Results Reporting

KRON broadcast vote results for a local race on election day before polls closed. The broadcast was blamed on a “computer glitch” at KRON TV. We are not aware of any investigation conducted to determine the source of the so-called “glitch.” This needs to be explained more fully by the ROV and KRON.




Figure 13 -- Front-Loaded Poll Results Reported?

Stored and Locked Empty VBM Envelopes Unlocked and “Sorted”

It was observed that some stored and locked containers of empty VBM envelopes were unlocked, and that their security rods were removed. When asked, the stated purpose was for “sorting by precinct.” That answer was a bit confusing. All VBM ballot envelopes were already sorted by precinct in the third sort before the envelopes were opened and the ballots extracted. Unlocking and removing the secure rod has the potential for exposing the unlocked

row of ballots to some unsecure slipping of envelopes into the container to match the sum of secondary ballot counts.

Unusual Turnout Consistency for Disparate School Board Races

Five school board races in very different districts had unusually consistent voter turnout. These districts varied by number of voter party registrations, issues, candidates, the number of candidates and the number of candidates a voter could select. Despite those differences, turnouts in all five races concluded within an inexplicable 0.7% of each other.

VOTER TURNOUT RESULTS IN 5 MARIN SCHOOL DISTRICTS IS A 5-WAY TIE

The number of candidates one can select, the number of candidates running nor the district size make a difference




Figure 14 -- Five-Way Tie in Turnout for 5 School Board Races

Source is Secretary of State

Comparing other race results show additional anomalies associated with the 3-day shutdown of ballot tabulation that occurred after Election Day.




Figure 15 – Effects of the Inexplicable 3-Day Ballot Tabulation Shutdown

Source is Secretary of State

This chart above breaks the turnout up into 4 periods to get some insight into how the election was shaping up as the tabulation results were being disclosed as ballot processing progressed towards certification. Each period shows the turnout percentage for that period.

The Registrar of Voters released tabulation results in increments, and we have pulled the ones released on the 11/8, 11/10, 11/13 and 12/5. The election was certified on 12/5. The sum of the four turnout period totals is equal to the final turnout of the certified results for each of the five races as shown in the final 5 certified results on the right.

Some observations on the Novato Unified School Board District 4 (Novato School 4) race in which Tief Gibbs Jensen was a candidate:

1. Novato School 4 jumps out to a big lead on the first release of election results, on Election Day 11/8/2022. Tief did not take the lead, but her school board district turnout did.

2. The first batch of results came after 8:00 pm on Election Day after polls closed and are estimated to be roughly 95% mail-in votes.
3. Novato School 4 outperformed the other 4 races in 3 of the 4 tabulation periods.
4. In 3 of the 4 tabulation periods, Novato School 4 outperformed the Governor's race turnouts (121%, 145% and 123% of the Governor race turnout).
5. Something unique was going on in the Novato School 4 race because it had a big turnout in the first and second periods before tabulation was shut down for 3 days.
6. If you extrapolate the turnout of the first period to certification on 12/5, then Novato School 4 was on its way to an +85% turnout.
7. That is a significant turnout and implies that race had something unique about it, perhaps a candidate that was resonating with voters. Tief Gibson Jensen was likely that candidate because she canvassed her district 3 times, speaking with voters and convincing them to vote their ballot and send them in, whereas her opponent remained largely invisible.
8. Novato School 4's turnout appears to have stalled in the third period, in which it came in last. That result kept Novato School 4 from attaining +85% turnout.
9. The Novato City Council 5 race had its biggest showing in the third period, outpacing all other races in turnout. That good showing for a separate Novato race emphasizes that the Novato School 4 turnout in the third period was an anomaly.
10. Novato Council 5 turnout was last or tied for last in the first, second and fourth period, but was first in the third period, an unusual anomaly.
11. The Novato School 4 race again regained the top turnout in the fourth period, so it suggests that it was unlikely that School 4's turnout was "losing steam" or reaching exhaustion in the third window.
12. The Mill Valley School race turnout tied with the Novato School 4 race turnout at exactly 73.2% for the certified result. But those two districts differ significantly. In the Novato School board race, voters were to choose 1 of 2 candidates whereas in Mill Valley's voters were to choose 3 of 5 candidates. The Novato race had 6,987 registered voters

whereas the Mill Valley had 23,170, but they tied for the overall greatest turnout percentage.

Through her relentless canvassing, Tief Gibbs drove turnout in the Novato School Board District 4 race. The other races were also won by Democrat leaning candidates, yet you didn't see the early enthusiasm showing up in the initial ballot tabulation period as you did in Novato School Board 4. Similar results are apparent in the Novato City Council District 2 race, but Andy Podshadley doesn't appear to have been as adversely affected as Tief Gibbs was in the Novato School Board District 4 contest.

The diminished or suppressed turnout during the 3-day ballot tabulation shutdown that occurred a few days after Election Day, is troubling and without explanation. This could have prevented turnout in the Novato School Board District 4 race from exceeding 85% turnout, which is a huge turnout for a midterm election. That would have been far greater turnout than in the other midterm local races or the race for governor. Andy and Tief's numbers both slowed dramatically in the third period, while the other 2 races showed a more consistent relationship to the Governor's race.

The falloff in turnout for the 2 Novato contests cannot be adequately explained by simply stating that the districts are small and that a relatively small change in ballots has a bigger impact on percentages than the same change would have in a larger district. That would not have affected just one ballot tabulation period. It would have affected them all.

Civic Center Ballot Processing Bottlenecks

Bottlenecks in ballot processing with ballot extraction, inspection, adjudication, and tabulation, as well as signature verification, and the delays associated with those tasks, erode voter confidence in results of the mass Vote-By-Mail and Voter's Choice Act election system.

DFM Associates Electronic Pollbook

The Marin County ROV reported to the Secretary of State as of September 9, 2022, that an Electronic Poll Book would not be used in Marin County for the November 2022 general

election. However, according to Thomas Montgomery, Vice Chair of the Marin County Republican Central Committee and Member of the Election Advisory Committee, Marin County does use the DFM Electronic Pollbook. The use of the DFM Electronic Pollbook was verified by election observers who served as a Vote Center Clerk and observed at the Marin ROV offices for the November 8, 2022, general election. See *Appendix G – Voting Technologies Approved for Use in California* for election equipment used by Marin County.

Voting Trends

The figure below shows votes by parties for the past 5 general elections as reported by the California Secretary of State.

Total Voter by Year					
Party	2022	2020	2018	2016	2014
NPP	23064	28683	23163	19711	18913
DEM	75658	92530	77901	67800	65409
REP	15545	18371	16062	14557	14369
AI	3509	4369	3508	2997	2946
GRN	722	906	752	657	639
LIB	1004	1214	971	806	759
PF	226	287	188	143	147
PPP	7	8	7	7	7
OTH	538	662	526	441	438
UNK	314	412	256	215	201
AMS	2	2	2	2	2
REF	43	52	48	50	51
NAT	10	11	10	11	13
CSP	44	52	43	40	34
CNP	4	6	6	4	5
AME	2	3	4	1	3
PIR	1	1	1	1	1
voted	120693	147569	123448	107443	103937
didn't vote	49780	22904	47025	63030	66536
Total Voters	170473	170473	170473	170473	170473
Turnout	70.8%	86.6%	72.4%	63.0%	61.0%
DEM Reg	106256	106256	106256	106256	106256
DEM TO	71.2%	87.1%	73.3%	63.8%	61.6%
DEM O/U	0.4%	0.5%	0.9%	0.8%	0.6%
REP Reg	20783	20783	20783	20783	20783
REP TO	74.8%	88.4%	77.3%	70.0%	69.1%
REP O/U	4.0%	1.8%	4.9%	7.0%	8.2%

Data based on Registered Voters File with History from the SoS extracted March 8, 2023.
Table assumes that voters didn't change registration in years previous to 2022.

Figure 16 -- Votes by Year by Party

Note how the turnout surged in 2020, then dropped in 2022. The over performance by Republicans exceeds that of Democrats in all years but the number of vote gains by Democrats still exceeded those of Republicans by 6:1 or more.

Fewer People Counting Votes

By implementing the Voter's Choice Act, Marin County reduced the number of vote counters tabulating ballots down from dozens among the 137 precincts down to one person at the Civic Center. This is not an advancement in the process but an apparent retreat from election integrity controls and a timely posting of election results.

Marin County Election Advisory Committee

The Marin County Election Advisory Committee was established by the Registrar of Voters in 2006 to act as a link between the voting public and the Registrar. The committee provides feedback and advice on issues such as voter participation and election integrity and learns about election processes and laws that impact the procedures of the Elections Department. The committee is interested in helping ensure that every eligible resident of Marin County can vote, and that all valid ballots are counted accurately and securely.

The committee is advisory only and has no rulemaking authority. The Registrar of Voters may designate subcommittees as needed to address specific topics.

The Registrar of Voters selects up to 20 members who are from various geographic areas of the County and who have different points of view and interests in the elections process. Residents from outside the County may be selected if they serve in a unique capacity within Marin County that benefits Marin County voters. The Election Advisory Committee (EAC) meets eight times a year from 9:30 am to 11:30 am.

Identified Vulnerabilities

The Election Integrity Committee has identified several vulnerabilities in our election system based on research of the Voter's Choice Act and observations of both the June 7, 2022, primary election and the November 8, 2022, general election.

No direct evidence of wrongdoing by any staff of the Marin County Elections Department was observed. All were professional and earnest in performing their work and were courteous to the observers that contributed to this report.

That said, an evaluation of the elections system processes identifies vulnerabilities that could be exploited to alter election results. An evaluation of election results further suggests that some of those vulnerabilities may have been exploited.

Common sense election law reform is necessary to eliminate many of these vulnerabilities.

Electronic Voting System Components

Four major components comprise an electronic voting system, namely:

1. Voter Registration – Controls the number of ballots in circulation
2. Voter Validation – Controls which ballots are counted/tabulated
3. Vote Tabulation – Controls how ballots are counted/tabulated
4. Vote Reporting – Controls the count/tabulation reported

Each of those major components is susceptible to ballot fraud, election fraud, or both.

Verified Voting reports on the election equipment used in Marin County:

<https://verifiedvoting.org/verifier/#mode/navigate/map/ppEquip/mapType/normal/year/2024/state/6/county/41>

Voter registration and validation is performed by DFM Associates software in Marin County. Dominion equipment and software is used for voting, ballot tabulation and reporting.

Electronic Voting System API

For a diagram of a typical Application Programming Interface (API) the following 1:49:50 video is worth watching in its entirety:

<https://rumble.com/v2gagxg-show-this-video-to-your-country-officials-machine-rigging-exposed-in-90-min.html>

Note that names on the voter registration file aren't necessarily real people, but once on the rolls those names are easily validated with loose signature verification laws. Malicious code might be used to affect vote tabulation. That code can come from the SoS via the Internet, or via a USD device or smart charging cord. As shown in the video, readily available SQL Server software can be used to flip vote results without leaving a trace of interference on system log files. The diagram below is modified from the video referenced above:




Figure 17 – Electronic Voting System API Diagram

The API diagram was created by Joe Oltmann of Conservative Daily. He used government Requests for Proposals, Requests for Qualifications, and system manuals for electronic voting systems to develop the diagram. It identifies several points of potential fraud, including an Internet connection to the voting system, VBM envelope inspection, voter validation, ballot extraction and inspection, ballot tabulation and reporting of the tabulation results.

The Voter's Choice Act election system used in Marin County follows a similar API. One should recognize that the only way the system will work is to have the voter rolls maintained at a central location (Secretary of State) and to keep the voter rolls live during the election.

Voter Registration

One of the most severe lapses in election integrity in California is that US citizenship is not verified before registering people to vote. Not the Secretary of State, nor the Department of Motor Vehicles nor the Marin County Registrar of Voters. All of them inexplicably rely on the honesty of the person registering to vote.

Registrar of Voters

The Marin County Elections Department has several questionable VBM mail and voter roll policies that create opportunities for election fraud.

VBM ballots mailed outside of California

California VBM ballots may be mailed to people that no longer live in California, thus enabling illegal votes by non-California citizens.

VBM ballots mailed to voters that never lived at address

Several Election Integrity Committee members have seen VBM ballots sent to voters that never lived at the address they were mailed to. Observers were handed such VBM ballots from concerned residents while working at voter registration tables prior to the June 7, 2022, election period. Such phantom ballots enable unscrupulous individuals to collect those ballots

and submit illegal votes. Given the extremely lax signature verification witnessed during the November 8, 2022, canvassing period, these votes are very likely counted.

Deceased on voter rolls with a status of “deceased/canceled”

While serving as Clerk at a Vote Center in Mill Valley, one observer noted that deceased individuals are still on the voter rolls with a status of “deceased/canceled.” It was also confirmed by the ROV, Lynda Roberts, and is shown in the Elections Department Vote Center Clerk training materials. The presence of deceased voters on the voter rolls is a potential source of “phantom voters” that can be used along with “live” voter rolls to cast illegal votes.

USPS

The lack of inventory controls by the USPS in handling VBM ballots has significant potential for election fraud.

Undeliverable ballots

Per ROV Lynda Roberts, undeliverable VBM ballots are sent to Assistant ROV Melvin Briones. It remains unclear if those ballots are secured or destroyed. If neither secured nor destroyed, they become an accidental source of unvoted ballots that can be voted in numbers sufficient to sway local elections.

Lack of USPS undeliverable VBM ballot inventory controls

The USPS does not keep track of how many undeliverable ballots it receives or how many it returns to the Civic Center. One Election Integrity member has learned from sources within the USPS office on Bellam in San Rafael that some are thrown in the trash. This lack of inventory controls enables a potential source of unvoted ballots that can be smuggled into the Civic Center and voted in the dark of night in numbers sufficient to sway local elections.

Lack of USPS voted VBM ballot inventory controls

During ballot processing, and in addition to normal mail delivery, elections staff retrieve voted VBM ballots in yellow envelopes from the main Marin County post office on Bellam Avenue and/or from the post office across the street at 2 Civic Center Drive. Maintaining ballot security and chain-of-custody protocols is somewhat challenging. According to election staff, security of bundled envelopes with voted ballots consists of rubber bands and open mail trays or unsealed mail bags. There are no inventory controls to ensure that the number of yellow VBM envelopes leaving the mail facility match the number received at ballot intake in the Civic Center. And there were some observations of lax chain-of-custody protocols that require that two elections staff always remain with the ballots. These lapses have the potential to inject illegally voted ballots into the system.

Vote Centers

Several vulnerabilities at Vote Centers have been identified, but two stand out.

Fraudulent voter IDs from online utility bills

An election observer demonstrated how easy it is to create a fraudulent document that would be accepted as a valid identification document at a Vote Center. He first went online to download his AT&T bill. That PDF file included his name, address, and an issue date of Nov 16, 2022. He then opened it in Adobe Acrobat, changed his name to “ERIK BLANE” and saved it as a PDF. Other than the name, the printed version of the fraudulent document was indistinguishable from the original. Changing the address or the date could also be done. That effort was duplicated by Francis Drouillard with his PG&E bill. Refer to Appendix A for examples.

Placing Provisional/CRV ballots directly in Black Ballot Box

An election clerk also noted that a voter that voted a Provisional or CVR ballot placed their voted ballot in the so-called “Black Box” without first placing the ballot in the green Provisional/CVR ballot provided to them. According to the Vote Center Coordinator, it could not

be distinguished from live ballots, thus it could not be retrieved from the “Black Box.” As a result, it remained and was treated as though it were a valid live ballot.

Ballot Processing

There are numerous vulnerabilities in ballot processing at the Civic Center that can be exploited to alter election outcomes, particularly in local races.

Signature Verification

The sorter is set to challenge approximately 75% of all VBM ballot envelopes on the first sort. For the November 8, 2022, general election that is 75% of 120,585 envelopes, or 90,440 signatures. Challenged signature ballots for 2022 was less than 1.0%, consistent with its history as reported by the ROV.

Table 2 – Historic Challenged Ballots Percentages

General Election	Challenged Ballots	Total Ballots Cast	% Challenged of Total Cast
2022	1,106	121,402	0.91%
2020	532	158,103	0.34%
2018	507	132,434	0.38%
2016	1,101	143,041	0.77%
2014	1,269	89,536	1.42%
2012	1,043	135,438	0.77%
2010	771	115,685	0.67%
2008	675	141,321	0.48%
2006	797	108,640	0.73%
2004	1,024	136,625	0.75%
2002	799	91,828	0.87%

Most observers of the digital signature verification in Rm. 121 believed that far too many signatures were quickly approved after one review that to them did not match sufficiently the signatures on file used for comparison. Most observers of the process also believed that they

were approving signatures at rates substantially higher than one every 10 seconds, which is the average time most people need to properly when comparing four signed ballot signatures.

Visual signature verification is very time consuming and unreliable. This part of the process wouldn't be necessary if photo ID were required to vote.

Ballot Extraction and Inspection

This is a very laborious and time-consuming task that creates a significant bottleneck in ballot processing. This process would not be necessary if ballots were cast in person.

Ballot Adjudication

Damaged ballots, or ballots completed in pencil or with red ink or Sharpie pens are sent for adjudication. Ballots completed in pencil or red ink are "repaired" by elections staff by marking over the votes with a blue or black pen. Damaged ballots are "duplicated" by elections staff.

The Elections Department does not schedule or limit times when adjudication occurs and performs the task as the need arises. This makes it more difficult to schedule observers to oversee adjudication, which prevents an opportunity for unscrupulous staff to alter votes.

One observer estimates that 90 to 95% of the adjudicated ballots she observed had Republican votes for Governor.

VBM Ballot Processing Bottlenecks

There are two major bottlenecks in VBM ballot processing at the Civic Center. The first is signature verification, which requires an exceptional amount of machine processing and manpower, far more than required by showing photo ID before voting. The second is ballot extraction, inspection, and adjudication. Again, this process requires far more machine processing and manpower than voters or elections workers feeding voted ballots into tabulators at the precinct level.

These are but two reasons why mass VBM ballot elections systems require 29 days before Election Day and 30 days after to complete instead of Election Day or a few days afterwards.

Tabulation delays

Along with live voter rolls, a supply of undeliverable ballots and the ability to print ballots, spreading out and delaying the tabulation of ballots over days provides an opportunity for unscrupulous individuals to steer results to a predetermined outcome. Tabulating ballots as quickly as possible makes it more difficult to do so and would help restore confidence in election results.

Live voter rolls

Along with the padding of voter rolls with phantom voters, using live voter rolls during the election is key to achieving a predetermined election outcome. Individuals at state and local levels can monitor which registered voters have already voted and their party preference. They know how many votes are needed to achieve a predetermined outcome and how many voters from a particular party they need to do so. Restoring precinct level voting with paper voter rolls would eliminate the possibility of such predetermined results.

Common sense election law reform is necessary to eliminate these vulnerabilities.

Conclusions

This potential for election fraud and ballot fraud with mass Vote-By-Mail ballots and an electronic election system far outweighs their convenience to voters. The excessive time and manpower needed to achieve a certification of the vote with that system erodes confidence in our elections and leaves far too many people with the belief their vote doesn't count or that elections have been stolen and they've been disenfranchised.

The best way to eliminate fraud in our elections and restore confidence in the results of our elections is to return to a system that has served this country well for hundreds of years. In other words, restore single day elections with in-person voting at the precinct level with photo ID required to vote on paper ballots and ballot tabulation at the precinct.

Recommendations

This section provides recommended actions to address problems discovered with the Voter's Choice Act election system used by Marin County.

Voter Registration

Require the Secretary of State or the County Elections Department, or both, to verify the citizenship of a voter before registering them.

Recounts

Enact legislation with a trigger percentage to require automatic recounts and audits of election results in close contests.

Registrar of Voters

Prevent the Marin County Elections Department sending VBM ballots out-of-state without an explicit absentee voter ballot request with strict standards for compliance and sending VBM ballots to addresses without first verifying that the voter lives at that address. Permanently remove deceased voters from voter rolls.

USPS

The USPS is an integral part of the mass VBM electronic election system. Require them to implement strict inventory controls that treat VBM envelopes as live ballots instead of mail.

Require the USPS to secure or destroy undeliverable VBM envelopes and to implement strict inventory controls when delivering voted VBM ballots to the Marin County Elections Department for processing. Require them to maintain a strict chain of custody.

Stop the practice of sending elections staff to the post office to retrieve voted VBM ballots.

Open up the USPS processing centers to election observer inspections during the election process.

Vote Centers

Require photo ID acceptable at US airports to vote or register to vote at vote centers.

Stop accepting documents downloaded from the Internet that are easily altered for use as acceptable ID such as utility bills.

Use different color ballot paper for normal, Provisional and CVR ballots so they can be readily distinguished from one another.

Ballot Processing

There are numerous vulnerabilities in ballot processing at the Civic Center that can be exploited to alter election outcomes, particularly in local races.

Signature Verification

Eliminate mass VBM ballots and return to precinct level voting with photo ID required to vote. This would eliminate the fraud prone and time-consuming bottleneck of signature verification at the Civic Center.

Ballot Extraction and Inspection

The laborious and time-consuming bottleneck of ballot extraction and inspection would be eliminated if ballots were cast in person at a precinct. Spoiled ballots and overvotes could easily be detected and replaced before the voter left the precinct. Precinct level tabulation will result in appreciable savings in time and costs as well since it can be completed in a single day instead of over several weeks.

Ballot Adjudication

As with ballot extraction and inspection, this time-consuming and fraud-prone task could be eliminated if ballots were cast in person at a precinct.

Tabulation delays

Large scale tabulation delays could be avoided if tabulation occurred at the precinct level.

Live voter rolls

Live voter rolls would no longer be needed with in-person voting at the precinct level.

Vote Validation

Imagine giving your vote directly to a candidate. When the election is over, your candidate counts the votes they received and reports that result to the County ROV. Your candidate's opponent would do the same. The one with the most votes would win the contest. A similar procedure could be used for ballot propositions. It's not that difficult to achieve. Consider asking candidates you support to use a vote validation website such as:

<https://www.validatemyvotes.com/>

In addition to voters completing and mailing their VBM ballot or voting at a Vote center, they would then visit that website and record how they voted. All people in neighborhoods canvassed would be encouraged to do the same. Not all the votes for a candidate would be captured, but a great many would. Such a "pre-canvas" would help identify election fraud.

If an ROV reports a result that differs appreciably from the "Validate My Vote" tally, candidates will have an extensive canvass that forms a sound basis to challenge the official results. It may even lead to a recount that changes the official results.

If not, it will still shed further light on the problems with a mass VBM electronic voting system that could eventually lead to a change for the better in our election laws.

Ultimate Recommendation

Most vulnerabilities in our election system can be eliminated by returning to single day voting at the precinct level with photo ID to vote and paper ballots tabulated at the precinct.

Strategy for Election Law Reform

The desire of everyone working for election integrity is to restore free and fair elections devoid of fraud. Eliminating electronic voting systems and mass vote by mail ballots is essential along with along with a return to single day voting at the precinct level with photo voter ID to vote on paper ballots tabulated at the precincts. Achieving that goal will require educating the public about how their elections have been stolen then pressing for election law reform.

We must continue our efforts to observe elections while building a movement to change our election laws. It will require the support of independents as well as Democrats, but they too see that their elections are open to possible election fraud. Democrats haven't forgotten how Hillary stole the 2016 presidential nomination from Bernie Sanders. Many Democrats in Marin County oppose the housing starts imposed by SB35 that will ruin their small towns and cities. Others oppose policies from radicals like Scott Weiner that have moved their party away from them, including the transgender movement that promotes child mutilation and cheats female athletes out of scholarships and other opportunities, the loss of bodily autonomy over forced COVID-19 vaccinations and the sexualization of young children via exposure to drag queens.


Election integrity is truly a non-partisan issue.


This committee will first reach out to as many grassroots groups as possible to share this report and our findings. We will continue to recruit, train and schedule observers for future elections. Help us by volunteering or donating at:

<https://maringop.org/donations/>

Together we can back candidates for office that support changing our election laws, first at the county level then with the state. That includes purging election fraud deniers from county central committees followed by the state party. It's the only effective way to achieve our goal of free and fair elections in Marin County and the State of California!


Item		Date	Location	Time (Range)	Staff	Observation
1		10/4/22	Secretary of State		website	Refer to Appendix E – Approved Voting Systems ("ApprovedVotingSystems_19015sl.pdf" from Secretary of State)
2		10/20/22	Civic Center Test of Ballot Counting Equipment	11:00 am 12:00 pm	Lynda Roberts Tony Aquilino	Tony tested ballot counting equipment in Rm 121. He showed on Dominion machine it was zeroed out before he ran test ballots. Then ran ballots in machine for each precinct. Then went to basement (Rm L-21), watched Tony zero out Dominion machines and run ballots for each precinct.
3		10/24/22	Civic Center Rm 126 Ballot Extraction & Inspection	3:12 PM		Observed ballot extraction and training for same.
4		10/24/22	Civic Center Rm L-21 (basement) Sorter	3:20 PM	Danny?	I was downstairs and saw the process... they are having the machine cut open the top the envelopes for the first time later in the day.. (It has probably already begun)
5		10/25/22	Civic Center Rm L-21 (basement) Sorter	2:00 pm 3:30 pm	Lynda Roberts Tony Aquilino Danny	Danny stored VBM in trays until verified, then ran third sort. They then put 500 opened VBM ballots in trays with pink "E&I" labels to go upstairs (to Rm. 126) for ballot extraction and inspection. Rejected VBM ballots are stored in red trays to be manually inspected. Rejected VBM envelopes may have been opened, sorted and prepared for extraction. Could not verify.
6		10/25/22	Civic Center Rm 126 Ballot Extraction & Inspection	2:00 pm 3:30 pm	Lynda Roberts Tony Aquilino Danny	No damaged or miscut VBM envelopes observed this visit. Opened VBM envelopes stored in trays of 500 on a rack. Extracted ballots were accompanied by elections staff at all times. Elections staff did not perform E&I during this observation.
7		10/27/22	Civic Center Signature Verification	11:00 am 1:30 pm	Diane	Approved 4 at a time. If a signature is in question then compared to past voting signatures. Also can pull up household member (family) signatures. Poll workers appear to be matching signatures properly. Sometimes screen of 4 signatures accepted quickly (4-6 seconds total). VBM envelopes accepted after signature verification kept locked downstairs until next step.
8		10/27/22	Civic Center Rm 126 Ballot Extraction & Inspection	11:00 am 1:30 pm	Diane	No damage to opened VBM envelopes observed. The extracted and now unidentified ballots were unfolded and bundled with rubber band of 50 ballots. Lace in white cardboard box in same room until sent to Tony to scan (tabulate), then returned to same box and labeled. Then stored in locked, alarm set room. Enhance Ballot -- If voter used red ink pen or pencil to vote, blue highlight is used to transparently overlay oval and witnessed by one other work[er], and both workers use red pen to initial ballot at right top corner. Extracted ballots were accompanied by 4 workers in extraction room (one of which is also a scanner who works with Tony) . Empty VBM envelopes were stored in brown cardboard box by Supervisorial District grouping. Box has a metal rod to pass through envelope hole. Stored downstairs room for 22 months by law. Observer ballot extraction in Room 126 (across hall from Rm. 121).



Item		Date	Location	Time (Range)	Staff	Observation
9		10/27/22	Civic Center Rm 126 Ballot Extraction & Inspection	2:22 PM	Diane	"Return to Sender" ballots are kept for 22 months in a locked cage. They do not take anyone off the roll if the ballot is "Return to Sender." Voters are only taken off the rolls if they die (*) or if they register with another address (county?) (*) Bill McLaughlin noted at Vote Center in Mill Valley that the deceased are marked "Canceled."
10		11/2/22	Civic Center Rm 126 Ballot Extraction & Inspection	1:24 PM	Jenny	Follow-up to my visit at the "extraction and inspection" area visit today: Jenny, (the person who has observed elections in many countries), gave me a survey. She stated that they are just starting this today. They are asking all observers to fill it out. The survey asks my name and email address; which area I observed; how I was treated; and if all my questions were answered? Plus it stated that: More questions can be directed to this email: elections@marincounty.org
11		11/2/22	Civic Center Rm L-21 (basement) Sorter	4:24 PM	Tony Aquilino	 <p>AVMR130 - Cumulative Ballots Returned by Party & Return Status Printed: 11/2/2022 4:14:24PM</p>
12		11/3/22	Civic Center Rm L-21 (basement) Intake and Sorter	10:00 am 11:30 am	Lynda Roberts Danny	Ballots arrived in trays of 500. Danny picked them up at post office this day. Observed VBM envelopes being rejected by sorter because signature was not verified. Accepted VBM envelopes put in (sorter) tray with pink label; those needing signature verification put in (sorter) tray with blue label. Voted-already VBM envelopes stored in tray with blue label. Signature-rejected VBM envelopes stored in (sorter) tray awaiting signature verification.
13		11/3/22	Civic Center Rm 126 Ballot Extraction & Inspection	10:00 am 11:30 am	Lynda Roberts Danny	Signatures were displayed 4 at a time, but it appeared they were being individually approved. Does not appear to be a good way to verify signatures. Observed signatures that didn't appear to match may be put through. VBM envelopes rejected after (digital) signature verification put in red bind? (Not verified.)

Item		Date	Location	Time (Range)	Staff	Observation																																													
14		11/3/22	Civic Center Rm L-21 (basement) Sorter	3:59 PM	Tony Aquilino	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p style="text-align: center;">Cumulative Ballots Returned by Party & Return Status for November 8 2022 Statewide General Election on November 8, 2022</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th>Return Status</th> <th>DEM</th> <th>REP</th> <th>AI</th> <th>GRN</th> <th>LIB</th> <th>PF</th> <th>NP</th> <th>Total</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Challenged</td> <td>78</td> <td>22</td> <td>6</td> <td>1</td> <td>1</td> <td>0</td> <td>43</td> <td>151</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Good</td> <td>27566</td> <td>5850</td> <td>1015</td> <td>157</td> <td>209</td> <td>32</td> <td>7019</td> <td>41848</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Undeliverable</td> <td>1330</td> <td>257</td> <td>59</td> <td>8</td> <td>23</td> <td>8</td> <td>477</td> <td>2162</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>28974</td> <td>6129</td> <td>1080</td> <td>166</td> <td>233</td> <td>40</td> <td>7539</td> <td>44161</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p style="font-size: small;">AVMR130 - Cumulative Ballots Returned by Party & Return Status Printed: 11/3/2022 3:59:12PM Page 1 of 1</p> </div>	Return Status	DEM	REP	AI	GRN	LIB	PF	NP	Total	Challenged	78	22	6	1	1	0	43	151	Good	27566	5850	1015	157	209	32	7019	41848	Undeliverable	1330	257	59	8	23	8	477	2162	Total	28974	6129	1080	166	233	40	7539	44161
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15		11/5/22	Rm. 121	1:57 PM	Unknown	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p style="text-align: center;">Cumulative Ballots Returned by Party & Return Status for November 8 2022 Statewide General Election on November 8, 2022</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th>Return Status</th> <th>DEM</th> <th>REP</th> <th>AI</th> <th>GRN</th> <th>LIB</th> <th>PF</th> <th>NP</th> <th>Total</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Challenged</td> <td>193</td> <td>39</td> <td>10</td> <td>1</td> <td>3</td> <td>2</td> <td>73</td> <td>321</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Good</td> <td>34614</td> <td>7214</td> <td>1250</td> <td>189</td> <td>258</td> <td>39</td> <td>8776</td> <td>52340</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Undeliverable</td> <td>1330</td> <td>257</td> <td>59</td> <td>8</td> <td>23</td> <td>8</td> <td>477</td> <td>2162</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>36137</td> <td>7510</td> <td>1319</td> <td>198</td> <td>284</td> <td>49</td> <td>9326</td> <td>54823</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p style="font-size: small;">AVMR130 - Cumulative Ballots Returned by Party & Return Status Printed: 11/5/2022 1:57:37PM Page 1 of 1</p> </div>	Return Status	DEM	REP	AI	GRN	LIB	PF	NP	Total	Challenged	193	39	10	1	3	2	73	321	Good	34614	7214	1250	189	258	39	8776	52340	Undeliverable	1330	257	59	8	23	8	477	2162	Total	36137	7510	1319	198	284	49	9326	54823
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16		11/5/22	Rm. 121 hallway	6:58 AM	Unknown	 <p style="text-align: center;">Entrance to Rm 121</p>																																													
17		11/5/22	Civic Center Rm 126 Ballot Extraction & Inspection	10:30 am 3:30 pm	Jenny	<p>Extracted and now unidentified ballots stored on a desktop in trays in bundles of 50 each. The extracted ballots were accompanied by the elections staff at all times. The 11/4/222 emptied VBM envelopes with voter information on them were sent back downstairs by 3 county employees with a moveable cage. Extraction was done across the hall from Rm. 121 in Rm. 126.</p>																																													

Item		Date	Location	Time (Range)	Staff	Observation
18		11/5/22	Civic Center Rm 126 Prepare for Optical Scanning	10:30 am 3:30 pm	Jenny	Ballot preparation was done in Rm. 126. The stacks of ballots were put into open whiter trays. They were not under constant supervision.
19		11/5/22	Vote Center at St. Sebastian's Church	10:30 AM	Jill Blake	One person overseeing the ballot box. They called the Election Center (Elections Department at Civic Center) to inform them I was here. Someone came in with a completed ballot. They instructed him to put it in a yellow envelope and drop it in the black box. No ROV elections staff visited while I was there to ensure everything was running smoothly. No electioneering occurred inside the Vote Center. One individual settled outside, said "don't vote for Trump." Nothing was done.
20		11/7/22	Rm. 121	9:10 AM	Unknown	
21		11/7/22	Rm. 121	10:43 AM	Unknown	

Item		Date	Location	Time (Range)	Staff	Observation
22		11/7/22	Rm. 121	2:16 PM	Unknown	
23		11/7/22	Civic Center Rm 126 Prepare for Optical Scanning	9:00 am 2:30 pm	Jenny	The USPS delivers through the mandoor outside of downstairs lobby next to newspaper boxes ... door access to outside.
24		11/7/22	Civic Center Signature Verification	9:00 am 2:30 pm	Jenny	90% of signatures are both present and legible. Signatures are mostly approved 4 at once, unless a signature is questioned. The first person takes 11-30 seconds to verify 4 signatures, the second person takes 4-6 seconds unless there was a question. Signature-rejected VBM envelopes go upstairs for further review and send out letters to voters.
25		11/7/22	Civic Center Rm. 121 Ballot tabulation	9:00 am 2:30 pm	Jenny	1st machine in Rm. 121 is the tabulator being used. See screen shots of WiFi settings (items 21, 22 and 23).
26		11/7/22	Civic Center Rm. 121 Ballot adjudication	9:00 am 2:30 pm	Jenny	Frequently saw that "Select 2 or "Select 3" that have more boxes checked, but ballots were approved. Did not receive 48-hour adjudication notice, just walked in and sat down. Didn't ask for notice. Asked Jenny for the % of ballots adjudicated and said there is no way to know. Two staff performed ballot adjudication with supervisor assists. Bad votes were discarded. A few ballots appeared to pass through when it appeared all candidates were checked instead of "Select 2" or "Select 3."

Item		Date	Location	Time (Range)	Staff	Observation																																													
27		11/7/22	Civic Center Rm L-21 (basement) Sorter	10:32 AM	Tony Aquilino	 <p>Cumulative Ballots Returned by Party & Return Status for November 8 2022 Statewide General Election on November 8, 2022</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Return Status</th> <th>DEM</th> <th>REP</th> <th>AI</th> <th>GRN</th> <th>LIB</th> <th>PF</th> <th>NP</th> <th>Total</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Challenged</td> <td>241</td> <td>48</td> <td>15</td> <td>4</td> <td>4</td> <td>2</td> <td>102</td> <td>416</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Good</td> <td>40501</td> <td>8434</td> <td>1458</td> <td>227</td> <td>308</td> <td>46</td> <td>10333</td> <td>61307</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Undeliverable</td> <td>1330</td> <td>257</td> <td>59</td> <td>8</td> <td>23</td> <td>8</td> <td>477</td> <td>2162</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>42072</td> <td>8739</td> <td>1532</td> <td>239</td> <td>335</td> <td>56</td> <td>10912</td> <td>63885</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p>AVMR130 - Cumulative Ballots Returned by Party & Return Status Printed: 11/7/2022 10:32:10AM</p>	Return Status	DEM	REP	AI	GRN	LIB	PF	NP	Total	Challenged	241	48	15	4	4	2	102	416	Good	40501	8434	1458	227	308	46	10333	61307	Undeliverable	1330	257	59	8	23	8	477	2162	Total	42072	8739	1532	239	335	56	10912	63885
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28		11/7/22	Civic Center	6:28 PM	Tony Aquilino	65733 total returned (VBM ballots)																																													
29		11/8/22	Civic Center	8:00 AM	Jenny and Danny	<p>November 8, 2022</p> <p>I was at the Civic Center at 8:00. Jenny told me that the upstairs ballot adjudication and the "Betsy Ross" ballot processing downstairs would not begin until at least 11:30 or 12:30. So, I just watched the extraction and inspection of ballots.</p> <p>Jenny told me that the 121 staff was busy verifying signatures and faxing ballots to people overseas who don't have ballots. (Danny walked into extraction and inspection.. to pick up empty containers... so I talked to him in the hallway. He remembered my name and was very friendly).</p>																																													
30		11/8/22	Civic Center	8:00 AM	Jenny and Danny	The undeliverable ballots : 1)are given to "Melvin" in room 121 (I don't know who Melvin is). Jenny said that they are kept for 22 months. However, she also said that "Melvin" notates the name and address of the each undeliverable and it is conveyed to Sacramento and some computer in Marin. Someone else should ask again... to see if that answer is the same. 2)Danny said that the undeliverable ballots do not go through "Betsy Ross".																																													
31		11/8/22	Civic Center	8:00 AM	Jenny and Danny	The "Mail in" Ballots: 1) Danny told me that two people always collect them from the post office. However, they might have to park a vehicle... so one person may be bringing them in. 2) Danny said that the number of ballots is not counted before they leave the post office... or when they arrive at the Civic Center. 3) Danny also told me that there is a fluorescent bar code on the envelop and that they do not process any that are date stamped after the 8th. However, I think he told me that he doesn't know what happens to those ballot envelops that are dated after the 8th. That should be verified.																																													
32		11/8/22	Civic Center	8:00 AM	Jenny and Danny	When I voted this morning at Hamilton, I was told that: Ballots from the Voting Centers are counted before they leave the voting center and carried over, by two people, at the end of the day, and recounted at the Civic Center.																																													

Item		Date	Location	Time (Range)	Staff	Observation
33		11/8/22	Civic Center Outside Rm. 121	4:39 PM	Lynda Roberts	 <p>KRON broadcast results for the Novato City Council District 2 seat before polls closed.</p>
34		11/8/22	Civic Center Lobby	10:25:00 AM 3:27 PM	n.a.	
35		11/8/22	Civic Center Rm L-21 (basement) Sorter	2:00 pm 4:30 pm	Lynda Robers	<p>Ask for AVMR report at end of shift. Basement VBM reciving area: Containers used to transport VBM envelopes are 24x18x18: blue bags with straps. Printed ballots form Vote Center were kept in white boxes next to sorter. The sorter is connected to the ROV internal network. Rejected because voter already voted are sorted and kept in red box but none observed. Rare. Sorter separates by precinct, photo of signature taken. Only 25% of signatures validated on first pass by sorter.</p>

Item		Date	Location	Time (Range)	Staff	Observation																																													
36		11/8/22	Civic Center Signature Verification	2:00 pm 4:30 pm	Lynda Robers	Signatures were present and legible; approved all at once after individual evaluation/rejection. It appeared that poll workers were matching signatures properly. Second sort, signature already verified by machine or staff. Accepted envelopes are stored in a sorter tray for a third sort. Sorted VBM envelopes are in bin, each has a specifi # or ID. Staff manual signature verification after 2nd sort -- already done once after 1st sort. After signatures accepted, VBM envelopes go back in bin for 3rd sort. Opened and sorted VBM envelopes brought in bins from downstairs to 1st floor. Each bin has and i.d. #.																																													
37		11/8/22	Civic Center Rm 126 Ballot Extraction & Inspection	2:00 pm 4:30 pm	Lynda Robers	In room across from Rm 121. Extracted ballots accompanied by elections staff at all times. Emptied VBM envelopes stayed in Rm. 126. No irregularities observed when ballots unfolded and stacked. Stacks of 50? 500 per container. Ballots kept in Rm 121? before tabulating; ballot preparation in Rm. 121 only.																																													
38		11/8/22	Civic Center Rm. 121 Ballot tabulation	2:00 pm 4:30 pm	Lynda Robers	Dominion software re-booted in the middle of adjudication. Cannot get close enough to tabulator to verify zeroed out before scanning. WiFi? 1) linksys, 2" Marin County Pulbic, 3 Court Public. Observed ballots only scanned once. Staff never uses the word "rejected."																																													
39		11/8/22	Civic Center Rm. 121 Ballot adjudication	2:00 pm 4:30 pm	Lynda Robers	Two sets of 2 staff adjudicating ballots. Nothing irregular observed, but if voter selects more than one condidate choice, the ballot is passed with both.																																													
40		11/8/22	Civic Center Rm. 121 Ballot adjudication	2:00 pm 4:30 pm	Lynda Robers	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p style="text-align: center;">Cumulative Ballots Returned by Party & Return Status for November 8 2022 Statewide General Election on November 8, 2022</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th>Return Status</th> <th>DEM</th> <th>REP</th> <th>AI</th> <th>GRN</th> <th>LIB</th> <th>PF</th> <th>NP</th> <th>Total</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Challenged</td> <td>287</td> <td>57</td> <td>16</td> <td>5</td> <td>3</td> <td>2</td> <td>87</td> <td>457</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Good</td> <td>48976</td> <td>10312</td> <td>1788</td> <td>296</td> <td>406</td> <td>65</td> <td>12778</td> <td>74621</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Undeliverable</td> <td>1330</td> <td>257</td> <td>59</td> <td>8</td> <td>23</td> <td>8</td> <td>477</td> <td>2162</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>50593</td> <td>10626</td> <td>1863</td> <td>309</td> <td>432</td> <td>75</td> <td>13342</td> <td>77240</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> </div> <p style="font-size: small; margin-top: 5px;">AVMR130 - Cumulative Ballots Returned by Party & Return Status Printed: 11/8/2022 4:05:55PM Page 1 of 1</p>	Return Status	DEM	REP	AI	GRN	LIB	PF	NP	Total	Challenged	287	57	16	5	3	2	87	457	Good	48976	10312	1788	296	406	65	12778	74621	Undeliverable	1330	257	59	8	23	8	477	2162	Total	50593	10626	1863	309	432	75	13342	77240
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41		11/8/22	Vote Center?	7:06 PM		I just voted here at the Civic Center. I had to sign as well. Regarding post marked ballots. All ballots mailed go through SF Post Office and gets stamped. I have seen the post marks. If the ballot is dated today or before, it gets accepted. If it is stamped after today, it gets rejected. Now for the catch. If the Marin Civic Center get a ballot and it is signed and dated today or before, and it has no post mark, it gets counted. Let that sink in. They say a judge made the ruling and it is statewide. -- Ron																																													

Item		Date	Location	Time (Range)	Staff	Observation																																													
42		11/8/22	Vote Center?	4:28 PM		One: I voted in person. They confirmed I hadn't voted and gave me a sticker identifying my district. I then signed a form so my signature could be verified. I wonder if the serial number on that sticker on my ballot somehow? I mean if my signature didn't match, how would they know which ballot to pull as invalid? Two: On the mail in voting, do we have any way to observe the post marked dates? I know they're going to accept mail in ballots for 7 days after. How do we confirm that they aren't taking them after that period? Even if they do take them, the post mark is still supposed to be today.																																													
42		11/9/22	Civic Center Rm. 121 Adjudication, Signature Verification	5:19 PM	Lynda Roberts	On signature verification; I felt they went fast and some signatures to me did not match. During adjudication; majority of the ballots, roughly 70%, were republican. They did select correct candidate. On 10 – 20%, the two did not agree on adjudication. One I felt they chose wrong candidate. The majority of the votes were Republican but they chose Democrat in Lt. Governor race. The tabulation machine was broken and for the entire 3 hours I was there, they did not run the machine.																																													
43		11/9/22	Civic Center	5:19 PM	Tony Aquilino	96170 total returned (VBM ballots)																																													
44		11/11/22	Civic Center Rm. 121 Ballot adjudication	2:12 PM	Lynda Roberts	<div style="border: 1px solid black; padding: 5px;"> <p style="text-align: center;">Cumulative Ballots Returned by Party & Return Status for November 8 2022 Statewide General Election on November 8, 2022</p> <table border="1" style="width: 100%; border-collapse: collapse;"> <thead> <tr> <th>Return Status</th> <th>DEM</th> <th>REP</th> <th>AI</th> <th>GRN</th> <th>LIB</th> <th>PF</th> <th>NP</th> <th>Total</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>Challenged</td> <td>825</td> <td>158</td> <td>53</td> <td>14</td> <td>20</td> <td>6</td> <td>305</td> <td>1381</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Good</td> <td>73701</td> <td>14608</td> <td>2769</td> <td>523</td> <td>709</td> <td>110</td> <td>20254</td> <td>112674</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Undeliverable</td> <td>1330</td> <td>257</td> <td>59</td> <td>8</td> <td>23</td> <td>8</td> <td>477</td> <td>2162</td> </tr> <tr> <td>Total</td> <td>75856</td> <td>15023</td> <td>2881</td> <td>545</td> <td>752</td> <td>124</td> <td>21036</td> <td>116217</td> </tr> </tbody> </table> <p style="font-size: small;">AVMR130 - Cumulative Ballots Returned by Party & Return Status Printed: 11/11/2022 2:12:54PM Page 1 of 1</p> </div>	Return Status	DEM	REP	AI	GRN	LIB	PF	NP	Total	Challenged	825	158	53	14	20	6	305	1381	Good	73701	14608	2769	523	709	110	20254	112674	Undeliverable	1330	257	59	8	23	8	477	2162	Total	75856	15023	2881	545	752	124	21036	116217
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45		11/15/22	Civic Center Rm 126 Ballot Extraction & Inspection	11:15 1m 1:00 pm	Tina?	Yesterday was the last day they accepted ballots that were postmarked on 11/8 or before. This allows for military, overseas votes, or just delays in having the Pony Express get across the county from West Marin. Ballots dated after 11/8 are not counted but stored. We observed the ballots being removed from the envelopes. The envelopes going through the third pass on the machine. And, about two dozen adjudications. (Sadly, Big Bird's write-in was thrown out as mayor for Fairfax.) Most of the adjudications had both names filled in where it said "vote for one". Those were marked complete where she said that vote is not counted. That seems like a logical place to cheat. But it would make sense for there to be a forensic trail to prevent cheating. When we left only about 80K had been counted. In my opinion any cheating has to be through the inner workings of the Dominion software.																																													
46		12/27/22	Civic Center		Stephen R. Raab Deputy County	Refer to Appendix F – ResponseToPublicRecordsRequest.pdf																																													

References

- [1] CA Elections Code:
<https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codesTOCSelected.xhtml?tocCode=ELEC>
- [2] CA Elections Code – Vote By Mail Voting:
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayexpandedbranch.xhtml?tocCode=ELEC&division=3.&title=&part=&chapter=&article=&nodetreepath=5
- [3] CA Elections Code – Mail Ballot Elections:
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/codes_displayexpandedbranch.xhtml?tocCode=ELEC&division=4.&title=&part=&chapter=&article=&nodetreepath=6
- [4] County of Marin Elections Department:
<https://www.marincounty.org/depts/rv>
- [5] California Secretary of State – Elections and Voter Information:
<https://www.sos.ca.gov/elections>
- [6] Staple Street Capital acquired Dominion Voting July 2018:
<https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/dominion-voting-systems-acquired-by-its-management-team-and-staple-street-capital-300681752.html>
- [7] Marin Election Advisory Committee meetings that followed the July 2018 acquisition of Dominion Voting by Staple Street Capital:
<https://www.marincounty.org/depts/rv/advisory-committees/election-advisory-committee/page-data/tabs-collection/2018/minutes>
- [8] History of California US House delegation:
<https://history.house.gov/Institution/Election-Statistics/>
- [9] Historical California voter registration statistics for general elections:
<https://elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/sov/2022-general/sov/04-historical-voter-reg-general.pdf>
- [10] CA Code of Regulations § 20960. Signature Verification Process.:
<https://tinyurl.com/CASignatureVerification>

Links to Certification of Election Technologies in CA:

[Voting Technology Vendors :: California Secretary of State](#)

[Voting Technology Used in CA](#)

[Voting Technologies Approved for use in California :: California Secretary of State](#)

[April 9, 2013 \(ca.gov\)](#)

Civic Center Observers:

23 election observers participated in keeping a watch over the Marin County 2022 general election process.

California Elections Code § 300.

- a) "Vote by mail voter" means any voter casting a ballot in any way other than at the polling place.
- b) "Military or overseas voter" means an elector absent from the county in which he or she is otherwise eligible to vote who is any of the following:
 - (1) A member of the active or reserve components of the United States Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, or Coast Guard; a Merchant Marine; a member of the United States Public Health Service Commissioned Corps; a member of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Commissioned Corps of the United States; or a member on activated status of the National Guard or state militia.
 - (2) A citizen of the United States living outside of the territorial limits of the United States or the District of Columbia.
 - (3) A spouse or dependent of a person described in paragraph (1).

(Amended by Stats. 2012, Ch. 744, Sec. 1. (AB 1805) Effective January 1, 2013.)

California Elections Code § 319.5

- a) "Electioneering" means the visible display or audible dissemination of information that advocates for or against any candidate or measure on the ballot within the 100 foot limit specified in subdivision (b). Prohibited electioneering information or activity includes, but is not limited to, any of the following:
 - (1) A display of a candidate's name, likeness, or logo.
 - (2) A display of a ballot measure's number, title, subject, or logo.
 - (3) Buttons, hats, pencils, pens, shirts, signs, or stickers containing electioneering information.
 - (4) Dissemination of audible electioneering information.
 - (5) Obstructing access to, loitering near, or disseminating visible or audible electioneering information at vote by mail ballot drop boxes.

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- b) The activities described in subdivision (a) are prohibited within 100 feet of either of the following:
- (1) The entrance to a building that contains a polling place as defined by Section 338.5, an elections official's office, or a satellite location specified in Section 3018.
 - (2) An outdoor site, including a curbside voting area, at which a voter may cast or drop off a ballot.

(Amended by Stats. 2021, Ch. 318, Sec. 1. (SB 35) Effective January 1, 2022.)

California Elections Code § 321

- a) "Elector" means a person who is a United States citizen 18 years of age or older and, except as specified in subdivision (b), is a resident of an election precinct in this state on or before the day of an election.
- b) "Elector" also means a person described in paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of Section 300, who, except for the residence requirement specified in subdivision (a), is eligible to vote in this state and meets either of the following conditions:
 - (1) He or she was a resident of this state when he or she was last living within the territorial limits of the United States or the District of Columbia.
 - (2) He or she was born outside of the United States or the District of Columbia, his or her parent or legal guardian was a resident of this state when the parent or legal guardian was last living within the territorial limits of the United States or the District of Columbia, and he or she has not previously registered to vote in any other state.
- c) Each person qualifying as an elector under subdivision (b) shall be deemed to be a resident of this state for purposes of this code and Section 2 of Article II of the California Constitution.

(Amended by Stats. 2018, Ch. 113, Sec. 1. (SB 1171) Effective January 1, 2019.)

California Elections Code § 336.5

- a) “One percent manual tally” is the public process of manually tallying votes in 1 percent of the precincts, selected at random by the elections official, and in one precinct for each race not included in the randomly selected precincts. This procedure is conducted during the official canvass to verify the accuracy of the automated count.
- b) In an election conducted using vote centers, a 1 percent manual tally can be conducted using the batch process set forth in Section 15360.

(Amended by Stats. 2017, Ch. 806, Sec. 3. (SB 286) Effective January 1, 2018.)

California Elections Code §338.6

“Precinct” means a geographical area within a county that is made up of voters and is formed pursuant to Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 12200) of Division 12. All voters from the same precinct are assigned to a specific polling place for an election. In an election conducted using vote centers, eligible voters from any precinct within the county can use any vote center located within the county.

(Added by Stats. 2017, Ch. 806, Sec. 5. (SB 286) Effective January 1, 2018.)

California Elections Code §349

- (a) “Residence” for voting purposes means a person’s domicile.
- (b) The domicile of a person is that place in which his or her habitation is fixed, wherein the person has the intention of remaining, and to which, whenever he or she is absent, the person has the intention of returning. At a given time, a person may have only one domicile.
- (c) The residence of a person is that place in which the person’s habitation is fixed for some period of time, but wherein he or she does not have the intention of remaining. At a given time, a person may have more than one residence.

(Enacted by Stats. 1994, Ch. 920, Sec. 2.)

California Elections Code §349

(a) "Signature" includes either of the following:

(1) A person's mark if the name of the person affixing the mark is written near the mark by a witness over 18 years of age designated by the person and the designee subscribes his or her own name as a witness thereto. For purposes of this paragraph, a signature stamp may be used as a mark, provided that the authorized user complies with the provisions of this paragraph.

(2) An impression made by the use of a signature stamp pursuant to the requirements specified in subdivision (c).

(b) A mark attested as provided in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a), or an impression made by a signature stamp as provided in paragraph (2) of subdivision (a), may serve as a signature for any purpose specified in this code, including a sworn statement.

(c) An authorized user of a signature stamp may use it to affix a signature to a document or writing any time that a signature is required by this code, provided that all of the following conditions, as applicable, are met:

(1) A signature stamp used to obtain a ballot or vote by mail ballot in any local, state, or federal election shall be used only by the authorized user of that signature stamp.

(2) A signature stamp shall be affixed by the authorized user in the presence of the Secretary of State, his or her designee, the local elections official, or his or her designee, to obtain a ballot, in any local, state, or federal election unless the authorized user of the signature stamp votes by vote by mail ballot. If the owner of a signature stamp votes by vote by mail ballot, he or she shall affix the signature stamp on the identification envelope in accordance with Section 3019.

(d) A signature affixed with a signature stamp by an authorized user in accordance with this section shall be treated in the same manner as a signature made in writing.

(e) A registered voter or any person who is eligible to vote, who qualifies as an authorized user pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (f), may use a signature stamp only after he or she first submits his or her affidavit of registration or a new affidavit of registration by one of the following means:

(1) Using the signature stamp to sign the affidavit in the presence of a county elections official.

(2) Submitting an affidavit pursuant to Section 2196 that utilizes a signature stamp that has been approved by the Department of Motor Vehicles and transmitted to the Secretary of State.

(f) The following definitions apply for purposes of this section:

(1) "Authorized user" means either of the following:

(A) A person with a disability who, by reason of that disability, is unable to write and who owns a signature stamp.

(B) A person using the signature stamp on behalf of the owner of the stamp with the owner's express consent and in the presence of the owner.

(2) "Disability" means a medical condition, mental disability, or physical disability, as those terms are defined in subdivisions (i), (j), and (l) of Section 12926 of the Government Code.

(3) "Signature stamp" means a stamp that contains the impression of any of the following:

(A) The actual signature of a person with a disability.

(B) A mark or symbol that is adopted by the person with the disability.

(C) A signature of the name of a person with a disability that is made by another person and is adopted by the person with the disability.

(Amended by Stats. 2013, Ch. 151, Sec. 1. (SB 111) Effective January 1, 2014.)

California Elections Code § 357.5

“Vote center” means a location established for holding elections that offers the services described in Sections 2170, 4005, and 4007.

(Added by Stats. 2017, Ch. 806, Sec. 8. (SB 286) Effective January 1, 2018.)

California Elections Code § 358

“Vote tabulating device” means any piece of equipment, other than a voting machine, that compiles a total of votes cast by means of ballot card sorting, ballot card reading, paper ballot scanning, electronic data processing, or a combination of that type of equipment.

(Enacted by Stats. 1994, Ch. 920, Sec. 2.)

California Elections Code § 2187

a) Each county elections official shall provide notice to the Secretary of State that the following information is available:

- (1) The total number of voters in the county.
- (2) The number registered as preferring each qualified political party.
- (3) The number registered as preferring nonqualified parties.
- (4) The number registered without choosing a political party preference.

(5) The number of voters by political party preferences in each of the following political subdivisions, located in whole or in part within the county:

- (A) A supervisorial district.
- (B) Congressional district.
- (C) Senate district.
- (D) Assembly district.
- (E) Board of Equalization district.
- (F) Cities and unincorporated areas.

(b) The Secretary of State, within 30 days after receiving the information specified in subdivision (a), shall compile a statewide list showing the number of voters, by party preferences, in the state and in each county, city, supervisorial district, Assembly district, Senate district, and congressional district in the state. A copy of this list shall be made available, upon request, to any elector in this state.

(c) The county elections officials shall prepare the information referenced in subdivision (a) and provide notice to the Secretary of State at the following times:

- (1) On the 135th day before each presidential primary and before each direct primary, with respect to all voters who are registered voters on the 154th day before the primary election.
- (2) Not less than 50 days before the primary election, with respect to all voters who are registered voters on the 60th day before the primary election.
- (3) Not less than seven days before the primary election, with respect to all voters who are registered voters on the 15th day before the primary election.

(4) Not less than 102 days before each presidential general election, with respect to all voters who are registered voters on the 123rd day before the presidential general election.

(5) Not less than 50 days before the general election, with respect to all voters who are registered voters on the 60th day before the general election.

(6) Not less than seven days before the general election, with respect to all voters who are registered voters on the 15th day before the general election.

(7) On or before March 1 of each odd-numbered year, with respect to all voters who are registered voters on February 10.

(d) The Secretary of State may adopt regulations prescribing additional regular reporting times, except that the total number of reporting times in any one calendar year shall not exceed 12.

(Amended by Stats. 2018, Ch. 269, Sec. 1. (AB 3258) Effective January 1, 2019.)

California Elections Code § 2188:

- a) Any application for voter registration information available pursuant to law and maintained by the Secretary of State or by the elections official of any county shall be made pursuant to this section.
- b) The application shall set forth all of the following:
 - (1) The printed or typed name of the applicant in full.
 - (2) The complete residence address and complete business address of the applicant, giving street and number. If no street or number exists, a postal mailing address as well as an adequate designation sufficient to readily ascertain the location.
 - (3) The telephone number of the applicant, if one exists.
 - (4) The number of the applicant's driver's license, state identification card, or other identification approved by the Secretary of State if the applicant does not have a driver's license or state identification card.
 - (5) The specific information requested.

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- (6) A statement of the intended use of the information requested.
- c) If the application is on behalf of a person other than the applicant, the applicant shall, in addition to the information required by subdivision (b), set forth all of the following:
- (1) The name of the person, organization, company, committee, association, or group requesting the voter registration information, including their complete mailing address and telephone number.
 - (2) The name of the person authorizing or requesting the applicant to obtain the voter registration information.
- d) The elections official shall request the applicant to display his or her identification for purposes of verifying that identifying numbers of the identification document match those written by the applicant on the application form.
- e) The applicant shall certify to the truth and correctness of the content of the application, under penalty of perjury, with the signature of his or her name at length, including given name, middle name or initial, or initial and middle name. The applicant shall state the date and place of execution of the declaration.
- f) Completed applications for voter registration information shall be retained by the elections official for five years from the date of application.
- g) This section shall not apply to requests for information by elections officials for election purposes or by other public agencies for governmental purposes.
- h) The Secretary of State may prescribe additional information to be included in the application for voter registration information.
- i) A county may not provide information for any political subdivision that is not wholly or partially contained within that county.

(Amended by Stats. 2015, Ch. 728, Sec. 46. (AB 1020) Effective January 1, 2016. Operative September 26, 2016, when the Secretary of State issued the certification prescribed by Stats. 2015, Ch. 728, Sec. 88.)